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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A NEW U.S. STRATEGY 
Since the end of the Cold War, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction have come to be regarded as the primary threats to the security of the United 
States and its allies.  The current US administration has responded to the attacks of 11 
September 2001 and the danger of even greater potential threats by highlighting the 
option of “preemption” as a part of the US National Security Strategy published in 2002.  
Preemption, while not explicitly allowed by the UN Charter, has long been recognized as 
a legitimate rationale for war, but only under the relatively narrow conditions of an 
imminent threat, the absence of alternatives to preemptive attack, and the proportionality 
of the attack to the anticipated threat.  However, in today’s threat environment, 
characterized by non-state actors with shadowy relationships to states and potential 
access to weapons of mass destruction, the viability of those criteria as a basis for war is 
increasingly questionable. 
In fact, the National Security Strategy is an expression of growing concern that a 
state cannot adequately protect itself from sustaining a potentially debilitating attack 
while faithfully honoring these criteria.  Technological advancement and globalization 
are rapidly decreasing the distance between the will to inflict great harm and the practical 
ability to do so.  In an age when ounces of toxins can kill thousands and 200-ton aircraft 
moving at half the speed of sound crisscross the sky, capabilities to kill on a large scale 
are, for the purposes of strategic planning, ubiquitous—and accessible by entities other 
than states.  Recognizing this, the US National Security strategy argues that it is 
impossible for US policy to be limited to preemption in strict accordance with the 
conditions of imminent threat and last resort, as these have been understood in the past. 
Thus, the real aspiration of the new US strategy, exemplified by the invasion of 
Iraq, is to assert a right to wage what would be better described as preventive war, that is, 
war aimed not against a clearly identifiable existing threat, but aimed to prevent the very 
formation of such a threat.  By this logic, the United States and willing allies would be 
prepared to use force to shape international conditions so that threats do not develop.  The 
2US invasion of Iraq was frequently described as “preemptive” because international 
custom extends some legitimacy to preemption and “that is the language currently in 
vogue;” but “recognizing that prevention is at issue here—not preemption—is key.”1 
The immediate problem is that preventive wars are unjust according to current 
conceptions of the justice of war and their manifestations in international law.  
Regardless of the actual utility of preventive war to protect against attack by terrorists or 
states armed with WMD, many concerned observers make the reasonable argument that a 
doctrine of preventive war is a prescription for endless conflict: Once the just war criteria 
of just cause and last resort have been modified and rejected, respectively, in order to 
allow preventive war, there appears to be no clearly identifiable standard by which any 
act of anticipatory self-defense could be condemned.  After all, every state is a potential 
threat to every other to some extent.  If preventive war were legalized without 
qualification, the world would be awash with pretexts for wars of conquest and 
aggression.  The impending dilemma, then, is that the good that could come from 
preventive wars aimed at terrorists and associated rogue states could easily be 
outweighed by the harm inflicted on international order by legalizing such wars. 
 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUSTICE OF WAR 
The ethical basis of US strategy in the war on terrorism is important for two 
reasons.  First, it distinguishes us from our enemies.  Our primary objection to terrorism 
is an ethical one: While we may regard specific terrorist groups as enemies because they 
attack us or because they happen to have interests inimical to ours, we regard terrorism in 
general as a threat to international order and justice because of the moral calculus that 
terrorists use to justify their attacks.  We define terrorism as a specific kind of violation 
of our ideas on the just use of violence, which we believe—and international law 
asserts—to have some absolute, universal applicability.  Ethics is not only the means by 
which we define our enemy in the war on terrorism, but the means by which we remain 
distinct from our enemy.  In a conflict that many believe to be one of civilization against 
barbarism, practical questions are inseparable from ethical ones.  Against all enemies 
                                                 
1 Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 
2003). 
3who employ violence indiscriminately, but against terrorism especially, we face the 
perennial questions of “How do we defeat such ruthlessness?  And can we defeat it 
without becoming ruthless ourselves?”2   
Second, our perception of the justice of our own use of force influences our 
ability to use it.  “Even the most powerful states wish others to view their actions as 
legitimate.  They need allies when undertaking military action and supporters to provide 
policing assistance, civilian infrastructure, and financial support in the aftermath of 
war.”3  The just war tradition provides a framework upon which we can evaluate the 
morality of our use of force; it has “become part of the way in which much of the world 
[speaks] of war and peace questions.”4  If the just war discourse renders an unfavorable 
verdict upon US policies, the efficacy of those policies is undermined.  This has led 
Michael Walzer to suggest, with some satisfaction, that “justice has become a military 
necessity.”5    
The importance of ethics in our use of force compels us to examine the conflict 
between our inherited understanding of just war and our new security strategy.  Is the 
preventive component of the US security strategy immoral?  Or is a reconsideration of 
the moral boundaries of war in order?  Such reconsideration would not be the first.  
Regarding the evolution of the just war tradition between medieval and modern times, 
scholar James Turner Johnson explained that “the various theories of just war produced 
in the former era presupposed certain features of war that were no longer present in the 
modern age… New developments in the theory and practice of war implied adjustment in 
the mechanism of restraint.”6  No one could deny that modern terrorism and the 
availability of WMD to rogue states presents new “features” to warfare.  As a result, the 
“just war tradition at the opening of the twenty-first century shows some signs of having 
                                                 
2 Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004), 19. 
3 Allen Buchanan and Robert E. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional 
Proposal,” Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 21. 
4 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 53. 
5 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 9. 
6 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition of the Restraint of War (Princeton: University Press, 
1981), 172. 
4reached the limit of its elasticity, as it were.”7  To refuse to adapt just war doctrine to 
current realities would be merely to keep it bound to old ones. 
But the intimate connection between the exigencies of security and the content of 
just war doctrine does not mean that the latter is merely a source of “rationalizations or 
public justifications for decisions made on other grounds.”8  This cynicism has an 
extensive history, as evidenced by Immanuel Kant’s complete expression of it more than 
two hundred years ago: 
Given the depravity of human nature, which is revealed and can be 
glimpsed in the free relations among nations, one must wonder why the 
word “right” has not been completely discarded from the politics of war as 
pedantic, or why no nation has ventured to declare that it should be.  For 
while Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and others whose philosophically 
and diplomatically formulated codes do not and cannot have the slightest 
legal force are always piously cited in justification of a war of aggression, 
no example can be given of a nation having foregone its intention [of 
going to war] based on the arguments provided by such important men.9     
Yet, Kant acknowledged immediately afterward that the concept of a “right” to 
war is meaningful to some extent: 
The homage that every nation pays (at least in words) to the concept of 
right proves, nonetheless, that there is in man a still greater, though 
persistently dormant, moral aptitude to master the evil in himself (a 
principle he cannot deny) and to hope that others will also overcome it.  
For otherwise the word “right” would never leave the mouths of those 
nations that want to make war on one another…10 
Walzer voices the same idea in the first pages of his seminal Just and Unjust Wars by 
observing that the very existence of moral language and the mechanism of moral 
reasoning are to some extent “coercive,”11 even if they are often overpowered by 
strategic calculations.  Thus Hedley Bull’s judgment that “a state that cites a just cause, 
                                                 
7 Nicholas Rengger, “On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 
78, no. 2 (2002): 353. 
8 Richard K. Betts, “Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 17. 
9 Immanuel Kant, “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795) in Perpetual Peace and Other 
Essays, Ted Humphrey, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 116.  (Kant’s extensive parenthetical 
insertions were omitted for the sake of clarity.) 
10 Ibid. 
11 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 12. 
5even if it doesn’t believe in it, is better than a state that ignores the idea of just cause 
altogether.”12  The citation of just war concepts acknowledges that violence should be 
subject to ethics, providing an opening for appeals for restraint.  And the impact of these 
appeals is evident in the actual conduct of states at war: For example, the fact that the 
United States and its allies have used force in measured, restrained ways in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, even at great danger to their own personnel, indicates that influences other than 
naked self-interest are at work.13 
 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
This thesis challenges the verdict of many contemporary ethicists that preventive 
wars are necessarily unjust.  It asks the following questions: By what reasoning does just 
war doctrine prohibit preventive war?  What is the quality of that reasoning, and does it 
remain valid in the face of recent changes in the character of international security 
threats?  Under what circumstances could a preventive war be just?  Does the global 
consensus on the importance of basic human rights offer a standard against which the 
justice of a preventive war—often aimed at regime change—may be measured?  What 
might be the consequences of the qualified legalization of preventive war on the 
international system? 
The thesis proposes that the increasing severity of the threat from terrorism and 
WMD must drive a change in just war doctrine to allow preventive war under certain 
circumstances.  The thesis examines the viability of human rights as a standard for the 
justice of preventive war and considers, largely on the basis of just war doctrine itself, 
whether wars of prevention may be just if they are waged against the governments of 
illiberal states.  This condition would limit the scope of a preventive war doctrine, 
empowering it to confront current threats without throwing the international system into 
disarray.  It would also be consistent with the growing international agreement on the 
universality of basic human rights.  In fact, this thesis will argue that the ethical problems 
of prevention and the ethical problems of humanitarian intervention are merely different 
                                                 
12 Hedley Bull, The Anachical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), 45. 
13 See Elshtain. 
6sides of the same philosophical issue: the ethics of unqualified state sovereignty, which 
underlies the current international order.  The new realities of security threats and the 
timeless realities of injustice behind state borders are both call for the violation of the 
sovereignty of certain states.  It is important that our conception of just war remains in 
touch with those realities, thereby empowering that ethical system to provide useful 
guidelines to national leaders and international institutions.  Specifically, the facts 
suggest that allowing preventive wars against illiberal regimes might do more to advance 
the goals of modern just war doctrine than continuing to prohibit them unquestioningly. 
Of course, the idea of reincorporating a judgment on the moral status of 
adversaries into just war theory is a challenge to the entire basis of the international 
system and invites attack on obvious philosophical and historical grounds.  Such 
judgments were at the heart of the Europe’s internal holy wars that culminated in the 
Thirty Years War, and Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and 
Peace, 1625), one of the founding documents of international law, was largely an effort to 
save Europe from the carnage that such religious conflicts could produce.  The denial of 
religious differences as a just cause for war is reasonably seen as a major achievement of 
Western Civilization.  But the West may have overreached by negating all moral 
differences as a just cause for war: After all, the doctrine of just war advanced by Grotius 
and other modern theorists is derived from natural law and individual rights, resulting in 
an ethical contradiction within the prohibition of wars against regimes that fail to honor 
those rights.  This contradiction is not new, and in various forms it has been a perennial 
feature in the literature on the use of force in the international arena.  But after 9/11, there 
is a new urgency to resolve it. 
 
D. OVERVIEW 
The next chapter begins this process by analyzing the relationship between the 
ethical criteria for the justice of war (jus ad bellum) and the security strategy of 
prevention.  This analysis begins with an itemization of traditional jus ad bellum criteria 
(just cause, right intention, proper authority, open declaration, last resort, proportionality, 
and chance of success) and an examination of the general security strategies of self-
7defense, preemption, and prevention.  The chapter then overlays prevention with the just 
war criteria, finding that last resort is the only criterion that prevention necessarily fails 
and that there is an inherent contradiction between the juridical criterion of last resort and 
the prudential criterion of proportionality in the case of a soundly reasoned preventive 
war.  In this context, the chapter critiques of the validity of the last resort criterion.  Next, 
the chapter examines the objections to preventive war, most of which are based on a 
practical concern with preserving an international order that has developed primarily to 
control interstate conflict in the realist paradigm. 
Chapter III examines the value of that current international order in providing 
security from new threats.  It begins with a look at the ways that the legalization of 
preventive war could threaten the current order.  The chapter then analyzes how 
successfully that order, which is optimized to confront the types of threats that arise from 
a realist conception of international relations, addresses new threats of terrorism and 
WMD.  To that end, the chapter identifies the key differences between traditional 
interstate threats and new ones, including the inversion of the role of power, the ethics 
and motivations of non-state groups, and the relevance of the internal characteristics of 
states.  Expounding on this last factor, the chapter explores how the illiberal nature of 
some states contributes to the severity of the threat from terrorism and WMD.  The 
chapter concludes that the current international order is of limited utility in confronting 
the threats of mass-casualty terrorism and WMD, and that preventive war might have a 
new practical utility and ethical basis in the current environment.   That ethical basis is 
made available by the fact that preventive wars against terrorism would be directed 
against illiberal regimes. 
Chapter IV investigates the possibility of human rights serving as a standard that 
could be used to place an ethical and legal boundary on preventive war.  The chapter 
begins by pointing out that the institutions that form the current international system, 
including sovereign states and the United Nations, have a basis in individual rights.  It 
then briefly examines the feasibility of a universal standard of rights, without entering the 
vast subject of what that precise standard might be.  Next, the chapter surveys the ethical 
issues surrounding wars of humanitarian intervention, with a focus on the work of 
Michael Walzer, and compares the suppression of human rights within state boundaries 
8to aggression across state boundaries, suggesting that both are violations of individual 
rights.  It follows that a government that suppresses basic human rights is already 
engaged in a mode of violence that is morally indistinguishable from the “aggression” 
that just war doctrine and international law identify as a just cause for war.  The chapter 
concludes by exploring the parallels between the ethical dimensions of humanitarian 
interventions and preventive wars, both of which cast the goods to be achieved by war 
against the international norm of inviolable state sovereignty; both questions, then, can be 
construed as searches for a formal criterion other than self-defense by which war can be 
justified. 
Chapter V concludes the thesis by putting the debate over preventive war into the 
context of the timeless contradiction within the international order between 1) the 
advancement of human rights that stems from the general peace and stability of an 
international system based on inviolable state sovereignty and 2) the abuse of human 
rights that occurs because the sovereignty of certain states is inviolable.  The thesis 
considers two proposals for legitimizing prevention in a controlled fashion in the 
international system, both of which link the justification of prevention to human rights in 
different ways.  The first, offered by Allen Buchanan and Robert E. Keohane in the 2004 
issue of Ethics and International Affairs, is a “cosmopolitan institutional” approach: It 
legally bounds preventive war by placing it under the authority of an international 
institution that creates disincentives for states to launch preventive wars that do not prove 
justified on human rights grounds.  The second approach, offered by this author, ethically 
bounds preventive war by modifying the jus ad bellum to admit war against a regime that 
fails to meet certain human rights standards.  This formal criterion, when combined with 
the practical utility of fighting such a war, would provide a basis upon which states could 
determine the ethics of preventive war. 
 
9II. JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND PREVENTIVE WAR   
A. JUS AD BELLUM CRITERIA 
Just war doctrine does not codify the justice of war.  Rather, it provides a useful 
framework of terminology, principles, and standards upon which to consider the ethical 
aspects of questions of war and peace.  The just war tradition has classical origins but 
was developed by Christian scholars through the late medieval period.  Afterward, the 
West’s idea of just war was carried forward mainly by secular jurists who began to 
establish formal international law.  Just war doctrine is reflected in modern international 
law and institutions, but it remains an ethical—not a legal—system.  Nonetheless, it plays 
a legal role by continuing to generate ideas on what international law on war and peace 
should be.  That is the purpose for which just war doctrine will be employed here: to 
provide insights on what the law should be regarding preventive war.       
The just war tradition addresses two related but distinct issues regarding war.  The 
first issue is the justice of war, jus ad bellum, which concerns the reasons and 
justifications of states for going to war.  The second issue is justice in war, jus in bello, 
which concerns the means by which states conduct war.  The question of whether 
preventive war can be just lies within the purview of jus ad bellum, and this paper will 
largely remain with that branch of just war doctrine.  Over the centuries, the question of 
jus ad bellum has come to be framed in terms of a list of criteria by which the justice of a 
war may be evaluated.  These criteria have evolved over time, but the following list 
concisely reflects the most modern conception of the just war. 
The first criterion is the most basic: just cause.  Self-defense is now regarded as 
the quintessential just cause, and the UN Charter codifies self-defense against acts of 
external aggression as the only reason for which a state may legitimately use force 
without UN Security Council approval.  However, as James Turner Johnson notes, the 
equivalence of just cause with self-defense against ongoing aggression is a relatively new 
idea; at various times the just war tradition has seen justice in causes of “defense of the 
10
innocent,” “recovery of something wrongly taken,” and “punishment of evil” also.14  
Indeed, international law appears to be rediscovering just causes beyond self-defense; the 
tension between the UN Charter and armed humanitarian interventions performed under 
UN authority is a “pale echo of the old emphasis on protection of the innocent.”15 
Related to just cause is the criterion of right intention.  This requires a state to 
intend by war only to rectify the causal injustice that makes war necessary, and not to use 
the opportunity of just cause to advance other interests or satiate wicked impulses.  
Though lesser known, right intention is one of the three oldest just war criteria: It was 
identified by St. Augustine, who was concerned about how a Christian could remain 
virtuous while engaged in violence.  Right intention was Augustine’s demand that war be 
conducted in accordance with the Christian imperative to “love thy enemy.” 
The decision to go to war may only be made by a proper authority.  Early in the 
just war tradition, proper authority could reside in either clerical or princely officials, but 
since the emergence of the Westphalian system in 1648 the authority to wage war has 
been left to the sovereign authorities of states.  The war must also be declared openly, so 
that an adversary has the opportunity to provide satisfaction of grievances without the 
need to resort to violence.  This gives way to the criterion that a war must be the last 
resort available to a state to achieve justice, allowable only after all other reasonable 
measures have been honestly considered. 
These first five criteria—just cause, right intention, proper authority, open 
declaration, and last resort—have a deontological basis; they speak to whether a state has 
a right to fight a war.  With the notable exception of right intention, they lend themselves 
to legal codification because they are objectively demonstrable—in theory, at least—in 
the same sense as evidence in a court case.  They can therefore be referred to as formal or 
juridical criteria.  As such, they relate to the procedures by which states may pursue 
claims against one another.  International law has at times shied away from codifying 
even this aspect of the jus ad bellum, but the potential legal utility of these formal criteria 
                                                 
14 James Turner Johnson, “Threats, Values, and Defense: Does the Defense of Values by Force 
Remain a Moral Possibility?” in Just War Theory, Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed. (New York: New York 
University Press, 1992), 57-59. 
15 Rengger, 359. 
11
is central in understanding both the ethical difficulties of preventive war and the solutions 
that this thesis examines. 
Formal criteria are not the whole of the jus ad bellum, however.  While they 
outline a state’s right to launch a war, they do not speak to whether a state should 
exercise that right—and the just war tradition has always been interested in the latter 
question.  Theorists on the ethics of war and peace since classical times have been 
concerned not only with the standing of a ruler to launch a war, but also with the wisdom 
of doing so, taking into the account the costs and benefits that the war was likely to bring 
to people on both sides of the conflict.  In De Jure Belli, Grotius acknowledges this 
distinction and argues that a war, though it may be “just,” should often be declined 
nonetheless on practical grounds.  He quotes Plutarch: “After the college of heralds had 
pronounced a war to be just… the Senate further deliberated whether it was expedient to 
undertake it.”16  Grotius writes that such a decision should be made on the basis of “the 
proportion which the means and the end bear to each other.”17  Accordingly, Grotius 
argues that there are certain injustices that are tolerable if war is the only alternative: 
These may be minor injustices for which recourse to war is not worthwhile or for 
relatively major injustices—even enslavement—if recourse to war is futile and would 
only result in death.18  
These are expressions of the prudential just war criteria of proportionality and 
chance of success.  As opposed to the deontological criteria, these criteria are teleological 
and thereby introduce a utilitarian element to just war thinking.  They are also inherently 
subjective, because they compel leaders to make value judgments and forecast the costs 
and gains of different courses of action.  They are therefore highly resistant to legal 
codification, so much so that Grotius felt obligated to apologize for examining them in a 
treatise that purported only to address formal, legal aspects of war.  But  since  then,  just  
war  doctrine  has  integrated  the  concepts of proportionality and  
                                                 
16 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), A.C. Campbell, trans. 
(Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), Bk. II, Chap. 24, IV. 
17 Ibid., V. 
18 Ibid., VI, and Chap. 25. 
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chance of success as jus ad bellum criteria in their own right.  They hold that it is 
unethical to use violence in pursuit of ends that do not compare favorably with the rights 
that war inevitably violates. 
 
B. SELF-DEFENSE, PREEMPTION, AND PREVENTION 
Apart from the ethical concerns of just war criteria are a set of categories rooted 
in the realist nature of the international system that describe the strategic—not moral—
calculations used by states to make decisions to go to war.  The categories of self-
defense, preemption, and prevention constitute a spectrum of security strategies ranging 
from purely reactive to purely active.  Self-defense is simply when a state reacts to an 
aggressor that is engaged in an attack. 
Preemption is typically seen as a sub-category of self-defense in which a state 
reacts to a clearly identifiable and imminent threat by initiating hostilities to thwart the 
threat or minimize its detrimental effect.  Predictably, preemption has been a more 
contentious issue for international law than the act of pure self-defense.  The potential 
justice of preemptive war has been recognized in the just war tradition since the time of 
St. Augustine,19 and “under the regime of customary international law that developed 
long before the UN Charter was adopted, it was generally accepted that preemptive force 
was permissible in self-defense.”20  The criteria under which preemption was permissible 
were given their clearest modern form by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842, 
who in complaining to the British of their attack of a mischievous US ship on the Niagara 
River wrote that the need to act preemptively must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”21  Webster also asserted that the 
preemptive action must be proportional to the threat it intends to preempt.22  Webster was 
in effect arguing for the application of the two just war criteria of last resort and 
proportionality to the question of preemption in international law.  (The British conceded 
                                                 
19 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition, 30. 
20 Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force.” Washington 
Quarterly (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003).  (Accessed online 26 June 2004.)   
21 As cited in Arend. 
22 Ibid. 
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Webster’s points and apologized for the incident.)  The UN Charter does not condone 
preemption explicitly and there is tension between the customary legitimacy of 
preemption and its prohibition by code.23  But deliberations within the UN itself on 
anticipatory actions have been centered on questions of imminent threat, last resort, and 
proportionality, indicating that international jurisprudence continues to allow for the 
possibility that a preemptive war can be just.24  
Not so for preventive war, which goes farther than preemption in anticipating 
threats.  Prevention is a “cold blooded” strategy undertaken before a crisis is ongoing or 
imminent.  It is intended not to eliminate threats that are fully formed, but to prevent 
threats from forming in the first place.  “Prevention exploits existing strategic advantages 
by depriving another state of the capability to pose a threat and/or eliminating the state’s 
motivation to pose a threat through regime change.”25    
The terms “self-defense,” “preemption,” and “prevention” appear frequently in 
discussions over the justice of particular wars, and this may have contributed to the 
conflation of these terms with just war categories.  But the fact is that the strategies of 
self-defense, preemption, and prevention do not arise from just war thinking or any other 
ethical system, meaning that there is no analytic relationship between the two types of 
descriptors.  In other words, just war doctrine can rarely render a priori judgments upon 
security strategies; the verdict depends on the specific circumstances of each case.  In that 
vein, one author warns that concepts like preemption and prevention “are really about the 
timing and method of war; they say nothing about the moral content of the conflict itself, 
and in the end an emphasis on them obscures the fundamental question of justice.”26  The 




                                                 
23 Johnson, Just War Tradition, 30. 
24 Arend. 
25 Freedman. 
26 Thomas M. Nichols, “Just War, Not Prevention,” Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 
25. 
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C. THE JUSTICE OF PREVENTIVE WAR 
An advocate of a specific preventive war would be challenged by a just war jurist 
on many grounds.  But on a theoretical level, preventive war fails the modern just war 
test by a slim margin, failing to meet only a single criterion: last resort.  The proponent of 
prevention is concerned mainly with what is the best resort in terms of national interests 
now and in the future, and purposefully seeks to avoid the circumstance of having his 
available courses of action gradually eliminated by the growing capabilities of an 
adversary, regardless of plausible alternatives to war.  Therefore, all preventive wars are 
necessarily unjust according to modern just war doctrine so long as it insists on last resort 
as a criterion for justice.  But what is the basis of that criterion, and does it remain valid? 
 
1. Examination of Last Resort 
In our time, last resort appears to be a natural criterion for a just war.  But last 
resort threads in and out of just war doctrine and has had different connotations at 
different times.  Cicero mentions last resort, giving the concept a substantial pedigree.27  
It was not included explicitly in St. Thomas Aquinas’s three jus ad bellum criteria that 
war must be declared by a proper authority, for just cause, and for a right intention.  
However, it must be noted that a declaration of war, following Roman tradition, implied 
last resort by giving a potential enemy the opportunity to satisfy demands; in that context, 
war was a last resort to be undertaken if the enemy refused.28  In parallel with this line of 
thinking was a separate idea from the proper authority criterion that a war could not be 
just unless there was no higher authority to which a polity could appeal for a redress of 
grievances.29  We see both of these elements—a refusal of an adversary to provide 
satisfaction and the absence of an alternative means of compulsion—in the modern idea 
of last resort.  So conceived, the criterion of last resort has a purely formal basis. 
But the blindness of last resort to prudential concerns is its first and most obvious 
vulnerability.  When faced with the choice of war or peace, decision makers must weigh 
the costs and benefits of fighting, as well as the costs and benefits of not fighting, and 
                                                 
27 Christopher, 12. 
28 Ibid, 51. 
29 Ibid. 
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those balances shift, often toward greater calamity, during the deliberation.  In other 
words, waiting for war to become the “last resort” has its own costs and risks that should 
be considered under the teleology of the proportionality criterion, but the last resort 
criterion prohibits this.  This utilitarian imbalance in just war doctrine could be tolerable 
only in the Middle Ages or early modern period, when a) military capabilities of states 
were relatively static, b) states were not subject to immediate lethal threats, and c) the 
costs of war were high compared to their ends.  None of these conditions can be assumed 
to obtain in today’s international environment.  Another argument on this theme is that 
the alternatives to war incur their own human costs, often more indiscriminately than war 
itself.  This leads Peter Temes to reject last resort explicitly as a criterion for “a just war 
theory for the twenty-first century”: 
The Catholic just war principle of last resort is pointedly not among the 
criteria that I suggest we affirm… What nations do instead of war—
blockades, propaganda campaigns, and restrictions on trade—often accrue 
terrible harm for the weakest among an enemy nation’s civilians while 
leaving the military and political leadership intact.  Thus they enact 
precisely the reverse of the discrimination principle.30 
A second difficulty with the last resort criterion is the epistemological problem of 
knowing what “last” is.  As Walzer observed in assessing the justice of the 1991 Gulf 
War, “we can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we reached it.  There is 
always something more to do: Another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another 
meeting.”  Walzer concluded that, at least in the context of Desert Storm, the criterion of 
last resort “doesn’t seem to play an important role.”31  Stated more generally, measures 
short of war are capable of admitting failure only at preventing harms from happening; 
the harmful event itself is the mark of the failure.  But when those measures are aimed 
instead at bringing about some event—withdrawal of an aggressor, restitution of a wrong 
done, etc.—there is no obvious point at which the effort can said to have failed and the 
criterion of last resort to be met.  Modern international law and institutions exacerbate 
this difficulty by providing a potentially interminable menu of penultimate alternatives to 
                                                 
30 Peter Temes, The Just War: An American Reflection on the Morality of War in Our Time (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 168. 
31 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), xiv.  See also Walzer, 
“Excusing Terror,” The American Propsect 12, 18 (Oct 21, 2001): 17 for a similar critique of last resort as 
a justification for terrorism. 
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war.  The result is that the last resort criterion has a status quo bias—desirable when 
conditions of justice prevail, but equally undesirable when an injustice exists. 
The final problem with the last resort criterion is a moral one that muddles even 
the apparently clear case of war as a last resort against aggression.  What circumstances is 
one to tolerate before war is the “last” resort?  An example is the divergent reactions of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland to Hitler’s demands in 1938-39: One chose surrender and one 
chose resistance, indicating that the very concept of national existence—the most basic 
value of realism and the backstop of any formulation of last resort—pivots on a moral 
judgment of what kind of existence is worth having.32 
In light of this analysis, the last resort criterion appears to be highly unreliable, 
even as a component of a doctrine that purports only to provide a general ethical 
framework for evaluating the justice of war.  In fact, it is doubtful that “last resort” is an 
ethical guideline at all: It might be more accurately described as a substitute for an ethic, 
because instead of informing a decision between plausible choices, last resort demands 
that we wait until such a choice no longer exists—regardless of the harm that accrues in 
the meantime.  Indeed, when just war authority J. Bryan Hehir criticizes the recent war in 
Iraq as “optional” and invokes the criterion of “necessity” as a “cognitive test to last 
resort,”33 he implies that no choice for war can be just; war must be forced upon us.  But 
this criterion of necessity inevitably founders on the same rocks charted above: Hehir 
contrasts the US war against Iraq in 2003 to the “necessary” US wars against Japan in 
1941 and against North Korea in 1950, but does not explain why the United States could 
not have allowed Japan to have its way in East Asia or attempted to coax North Korea out 
of the South with international diplomatic pressure ex post facto.  Since the choice to not 
fight is always available, fighting is always a choice as well.  Attempts to hide from that 
reality under the cover of necessity seem only to obscure the real ethical bases upon 
which those choices must be made. 
 
                                                 
32 Arnold Wolfers, as cited in Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the 
Ethical Issues” in Ethics and International Affairs, 2nd ed., Joel H. Rosenthal, ed. (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1999), 282.  Walzer notes the same contrast in Just and Unjust Wars, 52. 
33 J. Bryan Hehir, “An Unnecessary War: How Will It Be Conducted?” Commonweal 130, no. 6 (Mar 
28, 2003): 7. 
17
   
2. Other Criteria 
Further examination reveals that a preventive war, while potentially objectionable 
to just war sensibilities, does not fail additional jus ad bellum criteria necessarily.  To 
begin, the just war jurist might attack preventive war on the grounds of just cause.  A 
preventive war is ostensibly concerned with protecting a state from a future threat, and 
thus has self-defense as its cause.  Yet self-defense against a threat that does not yet exist 
is necessarily speculative; the proponent of preventive war could not point to any 
evidence that objectively proves his case.  Further, every state by its very nature 
constitutes some possible future threat to every other, making causes for preventive wars 
ubiquitous and defining the term “self-defense” to near uselessness.  Richard K. Betts 
warns that “when security is defined in terms broader than protecting near-term integrity 
of national sovereignty and borders, the distinction between offense and defense blurs 
hopelessly… security can be as insatiable an appetite as acquisitiveness—there may 
never be enough buffers.”34 
In a related issue, discerning right intention on the basis of a cause of preventive 
self-defense is difficult.  The only reliable way to completely and permanently eliminate 
the potential future threat of a rival is often “to change the political character” of the 
target state35 or to simply conquer it, actions difficult to distinguish from pure aggression.  
These are compelling challenges, yet they do not assert that just cause and right intention 
are impossible in a preventive war; they only assert that demonstrating just cause and 
right intention are highly problematic.  To this extent, the problems that just cause and 
right intention raise in preventive wars are not so much ethical as they are practical.  
On the other side of the deontological/teleological divide, the just war jurist 
would have even more difficulty indicting a proposed preventive war on the prudential 
criteria.  While a proponent of preventive war could not point to evidence of an imminent 
threat, he might well be able to make a strong case for the future development of a threat 
based on the nature of a state, including its ideological basis, current leadership, or past 
                                                 
34 Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1982), 14-43, as cited in Neta Crawford, “The Slippery Slope to Preventive War,” Ethics and International 
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35 Freedman. 
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behavior.  No legal standard of proof need be attained in this utilitarian domain: The 
proponent needs only to demonstrate that preventing that danger from arising would 
likely require the expenditure of less blood and treasure than waiting for the threat 
become imminent or actual.  Even if the proponent had no pretensions of certainty about 
the future threat, a mere probability of it developing—if the effects were sufficiently 
severe—could demand action.  Moreover, it is conceivable that preventive action could 
be the only chance of success that a state has at protecting itself from certain types of 
threats.  Finally, the proponent could also cite humanitarian benefits that might arise from 
a preventive war that are separate from its external threat altogether. 
These arguments could bestow a utilitarian merit to a proposed preventive war 
that would clearly distinguish it from the amoral interstate competition that is inherent in 
the international system.  It would be difficult to indict a preventive war as a pretext or as 
“unjust” if it can convincingly claim to minimize the harms that just war doctrine itself 
aspires to minimize.  There are fairly obvious historical cases when a preventive war 
would have likely accomplished the same end as a “just” war of self-defense with 
significantly less cost in lives and resources on both sides,36 thereby not only satisfying 
the proportionality criterion, but turning it against the position that prevention cannot be a 
just cause. 
 
3. Objections to Preventive War 
Nonetheless, it is the potential of prevention to be used as a pretext for aggressive 
war—a potential that states have frequently exploited—that lies at the root of objection to 
it.  Just war theorists have long regarded preventive wars as unjust ipso facto, and in 
precise contrast to self-defense, prevention is often cited as the quintessential unjust 
cause.  In De Jure Belli, Grotius begins his chapter on unjust causes of war with an 
account of the tendency of rulers to “colour over their real motives with justifiable 
pretexts,” and the very first pretext he addresses is that of a state attacking another 
because of the erection of fortifications that could unfavorably alter balances of power—a 
                                                 
36 Betts, in “Striking First,” acknowledges only one case of a preventive war—as opposed to a 
preemptive war—that was “not fought but should have been”: the French decision not to attack Hitler in 
1936, after he remilitarized the Rhineland.  Betts finds no cases of actual preventive wars that proved 
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reference Sparta’s claim against Athens in the Peloponnesian War.37  More famously, 
Grotius wrote that “to maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future 
annoyance from a neighboring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a 
doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity.”38 
More recently, in illustrating the concept of just cause for the purpose of judging 
the current war on terrorism, Neta Crawford announces plainly that “preventive war, 
waged to defeat a potential adversary before its military power can grow to rival your 
own, is not just.”39  Elsewhere, Crawford summarily dismisses the justice of preventive 
wars because such wars “assume perfect knowledge of an adversary’s intentions when 
such a presumption of guilt may be premature or unwarranted.”40  Betts writes that 
“preventive war is almost always a bad choice, strategically as well as morally,” and that 
“it is almost never possible to know with enough certainty that a war is inevitable.”41  
Walzer has a similar distaste for prevention: 
Preventative war presupposes some standard against which danger is to be 
measured.  That standard does not exist, as it were, on the ground; it has 
nothing to do with the immediate security of boundaries.  It exists in the 
mind’s eye, in the idea of a balance of power, probably the dominant idea 
in international politics from the seventeenth century to the present day.42 
Several themes emerge from these objections.  First is their realist balance-of-
power paradigm, in which preventive war is assumed to be driven by the inherent 
characteristics of an anarchical international system—specifically, aspirations for power 
by sovereign states.  The authors cited above are not necessarily “realists” in that they 
advocate realpolitik, but the policies they recommend are informed by the realist 
description of the international environment.  This paradigm has several limitations, all 
stemming from the assumption that states are the primary actors in the international 
system and thereby the only significant sources of interstate violence.  (The difficulty that 
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the realist paradigm has with describing the current threat of mass-casualty terrorism will 
be explored in the next chapter.)  The second theme of categorical objections to 
preventive war is the attention given to “fear” derived from “bare probabilities” of future 
danger, which Walzer distinguishes from a threat that is demonstrable by facts.43  The 
argument here appears to be that because “human life exists under such conditions that 
complete security is never guaranteed to us,”44 no level of perceived insecurity—that is, 
insecurity felt in the absence of objective evidence of a threat—can be admitted as a 
cause for war.  The third theme, closely related to the second, is the subjectivity of the 
alleged threat that a preventive war aims to prevent.  The inevitability of such a threat can 
never be proved. 
 
4. Prevention as Not an Unjust Cause A Priori  
Equally important for the topic at hand, however, is that neither may it be 
disproved.  The subtle equivocations that just war ethicists are forced to include in their 
objections to preventive war are telling.  Crawford can only say that fears of a future 
threat that motivate a preventive war “may be” unwarranted; Betts must be satisfied with 
the qualified statement that the rationale for preventive war is “almost never” certain.  
And Walzer could not argue that danger apprehended “in the mind’s eye” is always 
irrational.  Nonetheless, Walzer derives a “moral necessity of rejecting any attack that is 
merely preventive in character” because “it will always be a charge against us” 
[emphasis added] that we attacked unjustly,45 not necessarily because we did attack 
unjustly. 
These writers are by no means the first to be concerned with the problem of 
subjectivity of causes for war, which reaches an apex in preventive rationales.  The 
question of whether or not both sides in a war can believe that they have just causes was 
of concern to St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), considered the founder of the just war 
tradition.46  The question figured prominently in the works of Francisco de Victoria 
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(1492-1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).47  The uncertainty that surrounds 
decisions of war and peace led Grotius to write that “between wavering opinions the 
balance should incline in favor of peace,”48 and the issue of subjectivity caused him to 
reject the criteria of right intention, which is necessarily a subjective judgment and 
therefore beyond the view of law.49  More generally, the propensity of both sides in a 
conflict to subjectively conclude that they are in the right led Grotius to de-emphasize the 
ethical substance of the jus ad bellum “by reducing it to formalities,” thereby enhancing 
the relative prominence of the jus in bello.50  This trend continued into the nineteenth 
century, when positive international law avoided confrontation with the subjectivity of 
just cause by basically conceding a right of states to wage war and focusing on the 
conduct of war itself.51  The international agreements after the First World War, 
including the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter, fled from this subjectivity in the 
opposite direction by ruling all causes except reactive self-defense illegal.  In one sense, 
these documents reintroduced the question of jus ad bellum; in another sense, they came 
close to asserting that there is no such thing as jus ad bellum.  This contributed to the 
solidification of inviolable state sovereignty as the fundamental principle of the 
international system, a topic to which this paper will return. 
Given this history of efforts to banish subjective judgments of just cause from a 
secularized conception of just war as embodied in international law, the prohibition of 
preventive war is readily understandable.  And, again, prevention can never meet the 
criterion of last resort, and is therefore formally unjust according to current just war 
thinking.  However, the near universal acceptance of objections to preventive war does 
not alter the fact that Walzer and others who voice them can provide no a priori reason 
why prevention is an unjust cause.  Instead, they hold that the inevitable subjectivity of 
preventive causes—as opposed to the potential objectivity of other causes—is sufficient 
to reject them in principle.  The blanket prohibition of prevention as a just cause, 
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therefore, appears to be driven by convenience rather than by strict logic, meaning that 
Walzer’s “moral necessity” to outlaw prevention is actually more of a practical one.  The 
convenience sought is to avoid the thorny legal problem of judging a particular case for 
preventive war on its own merits; it is certainly easier—and not necessarily unreasonable 
in practice—to seize upon the potential demerits of other imaginable cases for preventive 
war and rule out the entire category as unjust. 
 
5. Contradiction between Formal and Prudential Criteria 
But regardless of any practical benefits that may be brought by declaring all 
preventive war unjust, the logical imprecision of such a decree introduces a contradiction 
between a) the prohibition of a preventive war on the formal basis that it is an unjust 
cause and not a last resort, and b) the potentially compelling case that might be made for 
the same preventive war on the basis of just war doctrine’s own prudential criteria of 
proportionality and chance of success.   What are national leaders to make of a just war 
doctrine that can concede the prudence or even necessity of fighting a preventive war, yet 
prohibit them from doing so for other reasons?  This contradiction comes close to being a 
banality, as all ethical systems seek to bound the limits of acceptable actions that 
immediate self-interest might motivate, even if those systems derive ethics from self-
interest or assert that ethical action is consistent with self-interest in the long-run.  To that 
extent, tension between ethics and self-interest is almost inherent; if there were no such 
tension, ethics would hardly be necessary. 
But the contradiction in just war doctrine’s prohibition of preventive war is 
especially debilitating because the cost of failing to act preventively when it is prudent to 
do so is measured in the very same terms—the human suffering that arises from living 
under injustice or fighting against it—that just war doctrine seeks to minimize from the 
start.  Those costs are fundamental and unrecoverable, begging the question of what 
higher purpose or more refined form of self-interest would be served by abstaining from a 






Just war doctrine is an important basis of our conceptions of war and peace and 
provides a framework for considering the justice of war.  When the security strategy of 
prevention is subjected to jus ad bellum criteria, it necessarily fails to meet only one: last 
resort.  But the criterion of last resort has epistemological and moral shortfalls that render 
it mostly meaningless and, to the extent that it has any meaning, highly questionable.  
Moreover, preventive war is not unjust a priori according to any other criteria, including 
that of just cause. 
Nonetheless, preventive war is widely held to be unjust because of its apparent 
incompatibility with an international order designed to suppress the violent behavior of 
states acting in accordance with realist predictions.  The difficulty in qualifying 
preventive war by any formal, objective criteria opens the door for prevention to be used 
as a pretext by any state that wishes to launch a war of aggression against another.  
Prevention is thus excluded as a just cause as a matter of practical necessity.  However, 
that exclusion contains a contradiction: just war doctrine insists that decisions of war and 
peace must incorporate utilitarian calculations of the proportionality of means and ends, 
yet the last resort criterion forces leaders to refrain from war until it becomes 
unavoidable, no matter what the cost of waiting may be.  Implicit in objections to 
preventive war is a judgment that the current international system itself—which the 
legitimization of preventive wars would alter—has its own value that justifies the 
unqualified prohibition of preventive war.  The actual value of the international system at 
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER AS A VALUE IN JUST WAR THINKING  
A. PREVENTIVE WAR AS A THREAT TO THE CURRENT ORDER 
The preceding chapter concluded that ethical objections to preventive war are 
expressions of practical concerns that the international system itself—in which preventive 
war is illegal—serves a vital role in suppressing interstate violence.  Legitimization of 
preventive war is widely believed to “undermine existing beneficial norms constraining 
the use of force.”52 These current norms, in turn, are aimed at the “modest and narrow 
goals” of preserving “international restraint and stability”—goals which arise from the 
classical realist description of international threats.53  Crawford has these goals in mind 
when she warns of the potential dangers of the new US strategy: 
A preventive-war doctrine undermines international law and diplomacy, 
both of which can be useful—even to hegemonic powers. Preventive war 
short-circuits nonmilitary means of solving problems.  If all states reacted 
to potential adversaries as if they faced a clear and present danger of 
imminent attack, tensions would escalate along already tense borders and 
regions.  Article 51 of the UN Charter would lose much of its force. In 
sum, a preemptive/preventive-war doctrine moves us closer to a state of 
nature than a state of international law.54 
 The incompatibility between prevention and international law arises from the 
subjectivity of judgments that the United States would rely upon to implement its policy; 
as chapter II pointed out, such subjective judgments are inherent in preventive strategies.  
With this subjectivity in mind, critics of the new US strategy frequently invoke the image 
of the United States as a “neoimperial” power that “arrogates to itself the global role of 
setting standards, determining threats, using force, and meting out justice.  It is a vision in  
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which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more 
conditional for countries that challenge Washington’s standards of internal and external 
behavior.”55 
 Again, these arguments do not follow from any a priori injustice of preventive 
war.  Instead they arise from the harmful empirical effects in the international system that 
might result from the availability of the preventive rationale as a potential just cause for 
war.  The critical point is not whether all preventive causes would be mere pretexts for 
wars of aggression, but rather that preventive causes would indeed be used for that 
purpose, thereby thwarting any attempts of international law to limit war through jus ad 
bellum controls.  The resulting proliferation of speciously-justified wars could bring more 
net harm to the international system than would the occasional prohibition of preventive 
wars that were otherwise prudent.  In a sense, this argument expands the field-of-view of 
the proportionality criterion by raising questions about the structural effects of a 
preventive war beyond the war itself. 
This proportionality calculation pivots on the value one assigns to the current 
international order in and of itself, based on the principle of inviolable state sovereignty 
and concordant limitations on the when states may resort to war.  To the authors cited 
above, the current order outweighs all other values that might be uniquely obtainable by 
legalizing preventive war.  This is one of the ways that “the contemporary legal jus ad 
bellum… incorporates a positive valuation of the international status quo” at the expense 
of other values.56  Order is indeed a fundamental value, not to be taken for granted.  
Hedley Bull observes that “not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a 
sense in which it is prior to other goals…”  But Bull continues, “The proponent of order 
takes up his position partly because the existing order is, from his point of view, morally 
satisfactory, or not so unsatisfactory as to warrant its disturbance.”57  Thus, the current 
system must be justified not simply by its ability to provide order, but its superiority to 
other plausible orders.  So how satisfactory is the current international order from our 
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point of view?  Specifically, how effectively does the current international order provide 
what Bull lists as one of the four primary goals of a society of states: “limitation of 
violence resulting in death or bodily harm”?58  
The first issue that must be addressed is that the nature of the current international 
order is an unsettled issue.  It is well documented that the current system is either under 
stress or already changed from its Cold War configuration.  Uncertainty as to the current 
state of affairs is evidenced by “the absence of a consensus even on what to call the new 
system… We agree only on the term ‘post-Cold War’ and on the idea that we have no 
exact model for the kind of international system in which we find ourselves.”59  States 
remain the primary actors in the system, and there is no shortage of potentially 
devastating conflicts that could break out along international boundaries.  But the new 
urgency of combating non-state threats “requires a questioning of sovereignty—the holy 
concept of realist theories.  The classical realist universe of Hans Morgenthau… may 
therefore still be very much alive in a world of states, but it has increasingly hazy 
contours and offers only difficult choices when it faces the threat of terrorism.”60  
Whatever the current international system is, old assumptions about the fundamental 
nature of international relations, based largely on the realist model, no longer appear to be 
adequate:   
The new, dynamic, unsettled international environment has exposed the 
limits of a conceptual framework derived from a period in which 
international politics was dominated by great-power rivalries and 
international law gave overriding respect to the rights of states, no matter 
how brutal their internal policies.61 
Yet, many commentators seem almost desperate to cling to a conception of an 
international system that can fit neatly into realist categories.  The reason, perhaps, is that 
many international institutions, the UN foremost among them, exist precisely because of 
a perceived need to mitigate realism’s stark predictions for international relations.  
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Accomplishing those goals has involved value judgments—essentially, tradeoffs between 
order and justice.  A reassessment of the sources of danger in the international system 
threatens the validity of those judgments, which are institutionalized in the UN Charter.  
Legitimization of the preventive component of the US security strategy “threatens the 
‘conservative’ fabric of world politics shaped over four centuries and crystallized in the 
UN system’s recognition of sovereignty, prohibition of intervention and refusal to 
accommodate unilateral use of force beyond individual or collective self-defense.”62  The 
success of the UN at limiting violence in interstate relations is highly debatable, of 
course, but the fact remains that the main aspiration of the current international order is to 
suppress that particular type of danger.   
Thus, the realist description of international threats is at the heart of assertions 
that preventive war is unjust ipso facto, from Grotius onward.  That prohibition is a value 
judgment intended to minimize interstate violence, which is understood in terms of the 
realist premises that “a state’s military and economic power determines its fate; 
interdependence and international institutions are secondary and fragile phenomena; and 
states’ objectives are imposed by the threats to their survival or security.”63  The 
prohibition of preventive war is a reasonable moral approximation only to the extent that 
these assumptions are true.  But their truth is increasingly doubtful.  One author renders 
the verdict that the UN Charter “is grounded on a premise that is simply no longer 
valid—the assumption that the core threat to international security still comes from 
interstate violence.”64  An examination of the ways that current threats of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction defy this premise yields a strong case against the viability of 
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B. INVERSION OF THE ROLE OF POWER 
Throughout the history of states, the ability of a state to protect itself and threaten 
others depended on its power.  Of course, even the greatest states have come to ruin after 
miscalculating the extent of their power, and excessive power invites the growth of 
opposing forces, sometimes leading to conflict.  But these are secondary effects; 
fundamentally, power has been the currency of security.  For example, during the Cold 
War, the threat of Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe could be balanced by NATO tanks in 
Western Europe; Soviet bombers could be offset by NORAD fighters.  The Soviet 
capability to threaten the United States was constituted by its own power and limited by 
US power, and the inverse was equally true.  One of realism’s core premises, that power 
is a universal value sought by states, rests on the idea that power contributes positively to 
the security of a state.  This not only drives interstate competition, but has the potentially 
beneficial effect of allowing states to find peace in balances of power. 
This fundamental premise is no longer obtains in the West’s current struggle with 
Islamic terrorism.  The capabilities that al-Qa’ida used to kill 3,000 people on September 
11 2001 were not theirs; they were ours.  “The only technical mastery displayed by the 
terrorists of 9/11 was the ability to hijack and to fly jumbo airliners into extremely large 
buildings, neither of which they were capable of constructing themselves.”65  The further 
a state or a civilization advances, the greater the capability of actors such as terrorists to 
inflict harm upon it.  The advancement of technology and the rise of globalization in the 
West, both of which are correctly perceived as critical underpinnings of prosperity, are 
precisely what allow a group like al-Qa’ida to constitute a threat. 
As Joseph S. Nye has observed, “In the 20th century, malevolent individuals such 
as Hitler and Stalin needed the power of governments to be able to kill millions of 
people.  If 21st-century terrorists get hold of weapons of mass destruction, that power of 
destruction will for the first time be available to deviant groups and individuals.”66  And 
as evidenced by 9/11, terrorists do not even require WMD to kill in large numbers; they 
can merely transform peaceful capabilities into destructive ones at opportune times.  
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These observations go beyond the simple fact that advanced states have more to lose 
from attacks or that weak adversaries can use asymmetric tactics, both of which are 
reconcilable with the realist model of threats.  The key point is that the instruments of 
mass-casualty terrorism are integral to advanced states themselves.  As a result, terrorism 
turns the fundamental role of power in the international system, as understood by realism, 
on its head: The most powerful societies are no longer the most secure from attack, but 
the most exposed to it. 
 
C. NON-STATE ETHICS 
In addition to being exempt from the requirement to build their own capabilities, 
terrorist groups are exempt from the requirement to build their own societies.  
Consequently, terrorist groups are unhindered by a burden that drives the development of 
certain characteristics of states—at least successful ones—that are important factors in 
international stability. 
Members of terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida, as opposed to state governments, 
cannot reasonably claim to represent any society.  Walzer and his colleagues at Dissent 
address this basic issue in one of their initial responses to the 9/11 attacks, noting that 
“Terrorism, after all, doesn't require mass mobilization; it is the work of a tiny elite of 
militants, who claim to represent ‘the people’ but who act in the absence of the people.”67  
Johnson further explains that terrorism in its al-Qa’ida form is: 
the action of a self-constituted private group to achieve its own ends. Such 
groups or private individuals who commit terrorist acts for their own 
reasons do not have what the "just war" theory and the jihad theory alike 
require of those who initiate use of violent force—namely, responsibility 
for the well-being of a recognizable political community and act on behalf 
of the common good of that community. 68 
Terrorism’s lack of “proper authority” is a central ethical issue: It frustrates the 
efforts of states to counter it without violating jus in bello rules, and it is the only juridical 
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jus ad bellum criteria that most terrorist attacks objectively fail.69  For these reasons, 
“global terrorism is not the simple extension of war among states to non-states.  It is the 
subversion of traditional ways of war because it does not care about the sovereignty of 
either its victims or the allies who shelter [it].”70  In practical terms, the fact that terrorist 
groups have no “responsibility for the well-being” of the people they claim to represent 
empowers them to act without having to weigh the repercussions of their actions on their 
surroundings.  Terrorist groups can easily evade blame for the retaliatory damage 
inflicted by victims of terrorism; indeed, retaliatory action is often precisely what the 
terrorists seek, as a means to bolstering their legitimacy and accomplishing their ends.71  
Unlike political leaders who usually have some interest in the general health of their 
countries and must consider the risks that war poses to it, the leaders of terrorist groups 
are not exposed to any similar “downside” for instigating mass violence. 
Another consequence of terrorists’ lack of political responsibility is more subtle 
but very fundamental.  It is discernable in the Kantian argument that the burden nature 
levies upon men to overcome their inherent antagonism toward one another is the 
primary mechanism that drives man in the direction of perfection.72  As Lee Harris points 
out, a group of people subjected to this challenge can only overcome it and build a 
sustainable society by developing a “sense of the realistic,”73 which manifests itself not 
only in politics and technology but, more generally, in the development of viable norms 
for social behavior.  A terrorist group is under no requirement to construct a society, and 
is thereby absolved of most of the responsibilities of acknowledging reality and living in 
it ethically.  The technologically-advanced, globalized world gives people like Usama bin 
Laden access to destructive capabilities without requiring him to adopt the ethics that 
advanced societies had to develop alongside those capabilities in order to survive both 
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domestic and external conflict.  Just war doctrine itself is the prime example of such 
ethics.  Advanced nations have frequently fallen short of these ideals and inflicted great 
harm upon one another, but these ethics do act as constraints on the behaviors of states 
and underlie the international order.  Al-Qa’ida escapes these constraints because it is 
accountable to no constituency and is invisible to the international system; yet it aspires 
and has succeeded once already to inflict violence on a nation-state scale.  This mismatch 
between power and ethics is central to understanding Usama bin Laden’s “blithe 
unconcern with the ethics of war”74 and the horrendous acts of indiscriminate violence 
perpetrated by terrorists generally. 
 
D. NON-STATE MOTIVATIONS 
The non-state character of terrorist groups liberates them not only from the 
boundaries of ethics, but introduces the possibility of motivations that exist in a 
completely different plane from the traditional great-power competition that the 
international system is designed to suppress.  Terrorists may have political goals, but it is 
impossible to adequately describe the threat of an “apocalyptic” terrorist group such as 
al-Qa’ida solely in political terms.   
Michael S. Doran warns that it is essential to “comprehend the symbolic universe 
into which [bin Laden] has dragged us.”75  The symbology is not intended to be 
understood by United States; instead, “Bin Laden produced a piece of high political 
theater he hoped would reach the audience that concerned him most: the umma, or the 
universal Islamic community.”76  Mark Juergensmeyer echoes the idea that the attacks 
“had no obvious military goal” but should rather be seen in terms of religion: 
The authority of religion has given bin Laden's cadres the moral 
legitimacy to employ violence in assaulting symbols of global economic 
and political power. Religion has also provided them the metaphor of 
cosmic war, an image of spiritual struggle that every religion contains 
within its repository of symbols, seen as the fight between good and bad,  
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truth and evil. In this sense, attacks such as those on the World Trade 
Center… were very religious. They were meant to be catastrophic acts of 
biblical proportions.77 
Harris notes the lack of follow-up attacks and al-Qa’ida’s unconcern with either claiming 
credit for the attacks or associating them with any specific message or demands, which 
one would expect if the attack had been intended primarily to win concessions from the 
United States.  He concludes, in general agreement with Doran and Juergensmeyer, that 
the 9/11 attacks were not acts of “Clausewitzian” terror, but were “a symbolic drama, a 
great ritual demonstrating the power of Allah, a pageant designed to convey a message 
not to the American people but to the Arab world.”78 
None of this is to say that the attacks were not planned as rational means to an 
end; it is simply that the end does not match up with the realist description of states 
competing for security.  According to Robert S. Snyder, “Bin Laden wanted to hurt the 
United States for its own sake, but his principle goal in attacking America on September 
11 was to start a war that would polarize Muslims, thereby delegitimizing moderates 
linked to the United States.”79 Doran describes bin Laden’s plan in more detail: 
America, cast as the villain, was supposed to use its military might like a 
cartoon character trying to kill a fly with a shotgun.  The media would see 
to it that any use of force against the civilian population of Afghanistan 
was broadcast around the world… The resulting outrage would open a 
chasm between state and society in the Middle East, and the governments 
allied with the West… would find themselves adrift.80 
Regardless of the extent to which this plan is unfolding, the 9/11 attacks were at least 
partly intended to conscript the United States into a third party role—a supporting actor 
in “somebody else’s civil war,”81 with thousands of dead Americans and Muslims as 
props.  This interpretation is consistent with the common view that the war against 
terrorism is not primarily a struggle between Islam and the West, but a struggle within 
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Islam itself.  The conclusion for our purposes here is that the 9/11 attacks and any future 
attacks like it have political and religious utilities for al-Qa’ida’s leaders and followers 
that are very different from the traditional interstate competition for power envisioned by 
the realist model and current international institutions. 
 
E. THE INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF STATES 
If the 9/11 attacks were consequences of an internal struggle in the Muslim world 
between secular states and religious fundamentalists, as Doran, Snyder, and others argue, 
it follows that those states—and what goes on inside them—are highly relevant to US 
national security.  The threat presented by these states can take two forms, one traditional 
and direct, the other new and indirect. 
 
1. The Direct Threat of Illiberal States 
The first form is of the classical state-versus-state type.  It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to address the potential of rogue states to inflict harm upon the United States 
using unconventional means, foremost among them being the covert use of WMD and/or 
liaison with terrorist groups.  Regardless of those dangers, that kind of threat remains 
largely consistent with the realist framework, and embellishments of realist solutions—
deterrence, balance of power, etc.—and institutional controls may be effective with 
varying degrees of reliability. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that many of these states benefit—if one can call 
it that—from the same excusal from reality that is enjoyed by terrorist groups.  In what 
Harris calls “one of the deepest contradictions of the liberal system of national self-
determination,” governments that fail to confront reality in their domestic or foreign 
policies are nonetheless preserved by an international system, grounded in the power and 
wealth of successful states, that recognizes their sovereignty as inviolable and even 
sustains them with the purchase of oil.  In this “dialectical reversal,”82  states that would 
otherwise cease to exist because of inherent flaws are able—even forced—to persist, 
creating security risks and condemning the people inside those states to governments that 
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are under little pressure to modernize.  This interpretation, while certainly incomplete, 
sheds light on the apparent durability of the relatively primitive state of governance in the 
Arab world.83 
 
2.  The Indirect Threat of Illiberal States 
The second form of threat from these states is indirect, but for that reason, more 
difficult to deal with in the current international legal regime.  Certain states, even if they 
seek good relations with the West and adhere to norms of formal international behavior, 
can nonetheless play significant roles in the existence and character of international 
terrorism, which poses severe risks to the outside world.  These regimes support terrorism 
directly or simply tolerate it, preside unaccountably over miserable social conditions that 
fill terrorist ranks, or encourage various hatreds in order to bolster their legitimacy and 
deflect responsibility for their failures.84  These are common policies in the illiberal states 
in which Islamist terrorism is geographically rooted.  In explaining the rise of terrorism in 
this part of the world, Shibley Telhami writes: 
In the Middle East there are political systems that do not allow legitimate 
political organization for opposition, and there is much despair in the 
region. There is a felt need for organizing political opposition. This 
despair is connected to frustration with the political order, the economic 
order, and foreign policy issues… What bin Laden tries to do is empower 
those people.85 
Oppressive and exclusive governance does more than facilitate terrorist 
recruitment and inflame animosities against external enemies.  It plays a significant role 
in incubating the means of terrorism—violence directed against innocent people solely on 
the basis of their class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, etc.—which “apes or even 
intensifies the worst aspects of the oppressive regimes from which the terrorists 
emerge.”86  As Walzer notes, this tendency is a common “excuse” for terrorism that is 
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conducted by victims of oppressive regimes, where “state terror dominates every other 
sort.”87  When victims of oppression employ terror against their own government, “they 
are only reacting to someone else’s previous choice, replying in kind the treatment they 
have long received.”88  It is not a great leap to expect that these same individuals might 
use terrorism against external enemies as well. 
This is a formidable topic and can only be sampled here.  But, without diverting 
too deeply into sociology, the relationship between the internal politics of states and 
terrorism warrants some examination because it goes to the heart of the threat that our 
ethics on the use of force must be able to meet. 
One particularly systematic analysis of the reasons for the rise of terrorism in 
Islamic civilization is Mohammed M. Hafez’s Why Muslims Rebel.  Hafez argues that 
terrorism is often a product of “antisystem ideological frames” that provide three 
mechanisms of moral disengagement: ethical justification (indiscriminate violence is 
permissible to bring about certain objectives), advantageous comparison (terrorism is a 
minor harm compared to the acts of the terrorists’ enemies), and displacement of 
responsibility (the terrorists are forced to kill civilians as their only means of self-
defense).  According to Hafez, state repression and exclusion of the people from political 
processes—hallmarks of the illiberal regimes of the Arab world—are key factors in the 
development of these antisystem ideologies and their ruthless utilitarian rationales that 
endorse the killing of civilians on a large scale.89 
Another representative work is Paul Berman’s Terror and Liberalism, in which he 
makes a compelling case that apocalyptic terrorism has many similarities to Western 
totalitarianism, particularly the propensity to direct violence indiscriminately against 
collective groups.  Totalitarianism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
terrorism  to  arise,  but  the  correlation  is impossible  to ignore.  Referring to The Rebel,  
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written by Albert Camus in 1951, Berman writes that Camus “recognized a crucial 
reality.  He recognized that, at a deep level, totalitarianism and terrorism are one and the 
same.”90 
The link between totalitarianism and Islamist terrorism is a hatred of liberal 
society: hatred of people pursuing their self-interests without regard to higher purposes 
that cultural critics both inside and outside the West regard as essential to providing 
meaning in human life.  To Islamists, the “Western mind” is “without a soul, efficient, 
like a calculator, but hopeless at doing what is humanly important.”91 The various 
totalitarian movements of the West—Nazism, Italian fascism, communism—differed 
from themselves and from Islamism only by their identification of what was “humanly 
important” beyond living blithely in a liberal society: building a new Reich, a new 
Roman empire, a world free of capitalist exploitation, etc.  The violence of these 
movements arose from an “urge to rebel” inherent in Western liberalism, ostensibly a 
positive skeptical tendency to question authority.  But gradually, the “love of freedom 
and progress had become weirdly inseparable from a morbid obsession with murder and 
suicide”92 that attached itself to political causes.  According to historians Ladan and Roya 
Boromound, Hassan al-Banna, the grandfather of the Islamist movement and founder of 
the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, adapted the “the idea of heroic death as a 
political art form” from its origins in the political terror of the French Revolution and 
modeled his organization on Italian fascism.93  
This fusion of Islam and political violence was carried forward by subsequent 
intellectual icons of modern Islamism such as Sayyid Qutb—who, like many of the 9/11 
perpetrators and planners, had spent significant time living in the West.  “Qutb’s brand of 
Islamism was informed by his knowledge of both the Marxist and fascist critiques of 
modern capitalism and Western democracy.”94  While Islamist terrorism has a religious 
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appeal to its perpetrators and its audience, its “religious vocabulary hides [its] true nature 
as a modern totalitarian challenge to both traditional Islam and modern democracy.”95  
Apart from this radicalization of Islam in the forms of the Islamist movement and the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, totalitarianism also rooted itself in the Muslim world in 
secular vehicles of communism, Baath socialism, and repressive government in general. 
Al-Qa’ida and other groups like it are products of this conflation of political 
violence and religion.  Berman concludes that that  
Al-Qa’ida and its allied groups were a nebulous constellation, spread 
across many countries, and the nebulous constellation rested on solid 
institutions with genuine power here and there, and the institutions rested 
on a bedrock of conspiracy theories, organized hatreds, and apocalyptic 
fantasies: the culture of totalitarianism.96 
This “culture of totalitarianism,” anchored by the current governments of the Muslim 
world, is relevant to the topic of the justice of the War on Terrorism.  Even in the 
traditional military arena, the characteristics of the governments of states can and do 
figure in ethical issues of war and peace involving those states.  “We see the adversary’s 
weapons programs and evaluate them in the context of the nation’s overall political 
behavior.  French and British nuclear weapons should concern no one who is not 
paranoid.  Iraqi and North Korean weapons of mass destruction should concern everyone 
who is not in denial…”97  The connection between the internal qualities of a state and the 
security of others around it is hardly a new concept: It was the primary motivation of the 
drafters of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,98 ratified shortly after the 
Second World War, for example. 
With respect to non-traditional threats, the internal characteristics of states are 
perhaps even more important.  The illiberal states that compose the Muslim political 
landscape are potential nexuses of the most intractable threats to international order and 
US security.  They have the capacity to develop or otherwise acquire tremendously 
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destructive weapons even though they might lack any moral constraints on using or 
proliferating them, and their totalitarian cultures can facilitate dangerous foreign policies 
or incubate fanaticism within their borders.  Clearly, the mix of these dangers varies by 
state, and because of their indirect character, they generally do not take the form or match 
the scale of traditional state-versus-state threats.  Nonetheless, many of these illiberal 
states are the “crossroads of radicalism and technology”99 whose very existence 
constitutes a hazard that is distinct from the nominal direct threat posed by every state 
against every other.  These threats are indescribable by realist theory, and as a 
consequence, the current international legal regime based on the UN Charter is largely 
“oblivious” to them.100 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The prohibition of preventive war is taken to be an essential element of the 
current international order, which is designed to suppress the kinds of threats that are 
evident in the realist model of international relations.  This model holds that threats arise 
from states as they pursue power towards the end of achieving security.  Since all states 
must act in this way, the internal characteristics of those states are not fundamental 
factors in the security environment.  Much of the international legal and institutional 
efforts of the twentieth century were directed against this category of threat. 
But new categories of threats have arisen that rival interstate conflict in potential 
severity and defy realist description, thereby challenging the validity of existing 
international limits on war, including the prohibition of prevention.  Specifically, the 
threat of mass casualty terrorism and weapons of mass destruction introduces non-state 
actors into the environment, thwarts the ability of states to find refuge in power or 
balances thereof, and exposes states to violence perpetrated for reasons apart from 
traditional interstate competition.  All of these are factors that the realist model cannot 
abide.   An additional challenge to the realist model is that the internal characteristics of  
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states are relevant in today’s security environment.  This is true for two distinct reasons, 
and a conflation of these reasons appears to be a major cause of divergences of opinions 
on the ethics of preventive war. 
First, illiberal states may present a direct state-versus-state threat that is motivated 
by ideological differences and/or traditional security concerns.  This is not a new reason 
for interstate tension, and it remains consistent with a realist description of the 
international environment even if the possible availability of WMD and unconventional 
means of attack make the threat less manageable.  The second form of threat arises from 
the indirect role that illiberal states play in constituting a terrorist threat to the United 
States.  This type of threat is a relatively new phenomenon, going hand-in-hand with the 
rise of global terrorism and the increased availability of WMD.  It confounds the realist 
model because the proximate threat actor is a non-state entity. 
Opposition to preventive war such as that voiced by Crawford and Walzer is 
generally framed solely in the context of the first form of the threat from illiberal states—
the direct form.  This is the type of threat against which preventive war is a highly 
objectionable remedy because all states, regardless of the nature of their governments, 
pose a direct threat to each other in theory.  The reason for hostile relations among them 
might be traced to ideological differences, but this is incidental.  In these cases, it is 
impossible to define objective jus ad bellum criteria to limit preventive war because 
ideological differences between states are ubiquitous and symmetrical, meaning that 
justifications for preventive wars on these grounds would be legally boundless.  The 
legalization of preventive war on this basis would effectively allow a state to attack any 
other that it simply dislikes.  
But a preventive war doctrine can also arise from a desire to combat the second 
form of threat posed by illiberal states: their role—purposeful or not—in the existence of 
terrorism and the potential danger of them putting terrorists in contact with WMD.  This 
form of threat is neither ubiquitous nor symmetrical: there is a strong correlation between 
illiberal regimes and the threat of terrorism.  This means that a preventive approach 
against terrorism may be bounded by objective criteria regarding the nature of the states 
that correlate with its existence.  A preventive doctrine qualified by some ethical 
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evaluation of the nature of the state in question would threaten the existing international 
order only to the extent that one believes that the inviolability of the most oppressive 
regimes are a necessary component of that order.  In light of this, predictions that the 
legitimization of the “Bush Doctrine” would necessarily have catastrophic effects on 
world peace appear to be overblown. 
In the meantime, proponents of a preventive strategy make a very rational case, 
only some of which is outlined above, that certain states are critical elements of a 
transnational phenomenon that produces apocalyptic terrorism and threatens to arm it 
with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  The merits of this case and the relative 
weight of the danger are open for debate, but the argument is plausible, and opponents 
cannot breezily dismiss it as a panicked response to 9/11, latent “imperialism,” or a 
Machiavellian pretext for the seizure of oil resources.  War to change the character of 
illiberal states in the absence of an imminent threat—or even in the absence of any direct 
threat whatsoever—has a new potential instrumentality that Grotius did not imagine: to 
prevent the development of threats that exist beyond states themselves and thus beyond 
the horizon of the current international system.  This is a “new development in the theory 
and practice of war,” as James Turner Johnson put it, that is once again calling for “an 
adjustment in the mechanism of restraint.”101 
Modifying the ethical and legal basis of international stability carries risks, but 
“adherence to the just war blanket prohibition” of preventive war is risky also, “given the 
widespread capacity and occasional willingness of states and non-state actors to deploy 
weapons of mass destruction covertly and suddenly against civilian populations.”102  This 
threat can be viewed as an evolution of the use of violence within the current 
international system.  Just as bacteria gradually adapt to antibiotics designed to kill them, 
violence has adapted to the international structure designed to suppress it; we call one of 
these resulting species “terrorism.”  In this view, clinging to familiar legal and ethical 
constraints on international behavior can only empower forms of violence that are 
powerful precisely because they defy that structure. 
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Neta Crawford epitomizes this inclination with her conclusion from just war 
precepts that, if the United States had received clear warning that the 9/11 attacks were 
about to occur and knew the identities of the participants, “a justifiable preemptive action 
would have been the arrest of the hijackers.”  But any preemptive attack on Afghanistan 
or al-Qa’ida camps would have been unjust103—presumably meaning that the United 
States would have to sponsor a UNSC resolution against the Taliban and hope that 
similarly precise and timely warning would appear prior to the next attempted attack. 
To borrow the phrase from Justice Robert Jackson, this recommendation literally 
transforms just war doctrine into a suicide pact.  The fact that intellectuals in the West 
can reach such conclusions suggests that our ideas of just war, particularly those relating 
to anticipatory actions, are in urgent need of revision.  Even so, the general stability 
provided by the international system remains an important value, and it would be reckless 
to forsake it in order to confront a threat that, while frightening, does not yet compare to 
the harm that would arise from a return to “a state of nature” in the international arena, as 
Crawford fears.  The challenge, then, is to protect the current international order as far as 
possible without protecting international terrorism along with it.  The solution appears to 
lie in carefully defining the mechanism of restraint for the kinds of warfare that are 
arguably necessary to prevent mass-casualty terrorism.  As suggested above, the practical 
rationale for such wars has a built-in potential for ethical limitation because it is 
applicable only to states that are illiberal to some extent.  The next chapter will 
investigate the suitability of human rights as an objective basis for the qualified 
legitimization of preventive war. 
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
A. RIGHTS AS THE BASIS OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
 
1. Theoretical Background 
The convergence of just war doctrine and human rights in this thesis is not 
contrived.  Modern just war doctrine and the entire international system have their origins 
in the rights of individuals.  Grotius began De Jure Belli, already identified as an 
important source of modern just war doctrine and a founding document of international 
law, with an exploration of natural rights.  R.J. Vincent, almost certainly with Grotius in 
mind, remarks that “at least since the seventeenth century, human rights or natural rights 
have been a conventional starting-place for political theory…”104  Indeed, Richard Tuck 
named Grotius “the most important figure” in the history of natural rights.105  Without 
the establishment of a basis of natural rights, Grotius’ secular treatise on the proper way 
for states to behave amongst themselves would have been groundless.  Tuck explains the 
importance of individual rights in Grotius’ conception of state sovereignty:   
Grotius was committed to a much more individualistic theory of the state 
than any of his Protestant contemporaries.  The rights enjoyed by the 
atomic individuals in the Grotian state of nature filled out the moral world: 
the state possessed no rights which those individuals had not formerly 
possessed, and was the same kind of entity as them.106 
Predictably, rights figure prominently in Grotius’ analysis of interstate relations.  Early in 
De Jure Belli, he identifies rights as the primary determinant of justice in the use of force: 
“Now right reason and the nature of society… prohibit not all force, but only that which 
is repugnant to society, by depriving another of his right. For the end of society is to form 
a common and united aid to preserve to every one his own.”107  Tuck observes that “the 
passionate desire for peace (both between states and between individuals) which informs 
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the De Jure Belli, and for which Grotius was most famous, was thus intimately connected 
with his rights theory: peace required respect for and protection of property, and disputes 
over rights were the prime cause of war.”108  
More recent theorists exhibit a similar concern for rights.  Walzer does not begin 
his contribution to the just war tradition with a derivation of rights, but he takes their 
existence for granted and offers them as the metric by which we recognize the harms of 
war.  Walzer prefaces Just and Unjust Wars by suggesting that 
the arguments we make about war are most fully understood (though other 
understandings are possible) as efforts to recognize and respect the rights 
of individuals and associated men and women… At every point, the 
judgments we make (the lies we tell) are best accounted for if we regard 
life and liberty as something like absolute values and then try to 
understand the moral and political processes through which these values 
are challenged and defended.109 
Later, Walzer advances rights as a condition of peace, saying that “we know the crime [of 
aggressive war] because of our knowledge of the peace it interrupts—not the mere 
absence of fighting, but peace-with-rights, a condition of liberty and security that can 
exist only in the absence of aggression itself.  The wrong an aggressor commits is to 
force men and women to risk their lives for the sake of their rights.”110 
Beyond the narrow subject of the justice of war, states themselves and the 
international institutions that recognize them are similarly dependent on rights for their 
status.  This is more than a theoretical interpretation; the idea is expressed in positive 
international law.  The UN Charter lists “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” as one of the primary purposes of the 
organization.111  The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), by listing 
these rights, asserts the authority of human beings—not states—in international law and 
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“suggests that human rights observance is the prerequisite for state authority.”112  Paul 
Christopher further emphasizes the view that human rights are prior to the rights of states: 
The purpose of granting or acknowledging rights for political entities such 
as states is not for the benefit of the states themselves, but to protect the 
fundamental freedoms of the constituents of those states.  Because the 
reason for a nation’s “absolute” sovereignty is to protect political 
independence and self-determination, the right of “absolute” sovereignty 
is conditional based on its fulfillment of this purpose.113 
In other words, state sovereignty is a means to the end of protecting rights.  That 
is their legal bases as derived by Grotius, and that is the purpose implied by present-day 
documents such as the UN Charter and the UDHR.  Christopher caps this line of thinking 
with the statement that “when states adopt policies of genocide, slavery, and other 
heinous injustices, talk of self-determination or political sovereignty is ludicrous.”   One 
guesses that Christopher is speaking directly to Walzer, whose proposed standards for 
humanitarian intervention, as will be seen, exhibit a striking deference to state 
sovereignty. 
 
2. The Universality of Human Rights  
This thesis has already hinted that a universally-accepted standard of human 
rights could serve as a qualifier for preventive war.  The actual content of that standard, 
however, is beyond the scope of this work and is not required for its major arguments.  It 
would likely resemble Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane’s definition of “basic” 
human rights—which would have a legal standing in their proposal for limiting 
preventive war—as  
the most widely acknowledged rights that are recognized in the major 
human rights conventions.  These include the right to physical security of 
person, including the right against torture, and rights against at least the 
more damaging forms of discrimination on grounds of religion, gender, 
race, or ethnicity, as well as rights against slavery, servitude or forced 
labor, and the right to a means of subsistence.114 
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Beyond that, the following few paragraphs will only examine the possibility of the 
existence of such a standard, without going into the details of what that standard might 
be.  The task is made easier by the fact that a universal standard of human rights has been 
the object of a great amount of international effort, reflected in a body of documents. 
The most prominent of these is the aforementioned United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.  
At the most basic level, the very existence of the UDHR indicates a consensus on the idea 
that universal human rights exist.  The drafters of the UDHR were encumbered by the 
requirement to express human rights in a form that was acceptable by both the capitalist 
West and the communist East.  As a consequence, the UDHR is a more a product of 
diplomatic expedience than philosophical rigor.  It is spectacularly silent on the origin of 
rights—an impressive omission for a document that asserts the authority of those rights—
and it expresses human rights so as to be consistent with competing philosophical 
approaches.  For example, even though the document’s civil and political rights are taken 
from the classical Western liberal tradition born in the Enlightenment—the preamble is a 
“virtual re-write” of the French declaration of rights of 1789, stating that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”115—the reflections of 
Enlightenment thinking are more linguistic than conceptual.  This allows non-Western 
cultures to buy into the idea of human rights without buying into Western philosophy at 
the same time. 
That said, the UDHR falls far short of being an enforceable universal standard of 
human rights, and its drafters had no intention that it should serve such a purpose.  The 
main reason for this limitation is that the document enshrines rights from two general 
categories that are, to a very real extent, mutually exclusive.  The first category is “civil 
and political” rights, which tend to be the negative rights (framed in terms of what 
governments cannot do) asserted in the political documents of the Enlightenment.  These 
were of primary importance to the Western countries in the drafting of the UDHR.  The 
second category is “economic, social, and cultural” rights, which are generally positive 
rights (framed in terms of what governments must provide), insisted upon by the 
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Communist countries and Western socialists.  The presence of both forms of rights made 
the document acceptable to countries that spanned a wide ideological spectrum.  
However, many of these rights, even if desirable in and of themselves, conflict with each 
other.  It is unclear, for instance, how to reconcile a right to private property with a right 
to food: how can a government provide food to one citizen without seizing it, or some 
other property in some fashion, from another citizen who has a property right to it? 
A vast amount of scholarship has been invested in attacking the distinction 
between negative and positive rights, the common theme being that the realizations of 
both civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights have active and passive 
components.116  In any case, the presence of so many items in the UDHR, whose status 
as rights is sometimes difficult to discern from the their identification as mere values, 
makes the document less of a demand for freedom and more of a menu of social 
desiderata to which states may assign their own priorities.  As a result, the UDHR is 
unsuitable as a basis for a minimum standard of rights for the purposes of authorizing 
war, as would be any document that defines human rights so permissively as to include 
paid holidays, for example.117 
Interestingly in the context of this thesis, Saudi Arabia was one of only eight UN 
members that abstained from the final vote on the UDHR.  The Saudi objections arose 
from the inconsistency between the rights to marry freely and change religion, on the one 
hand, and Islamic law on the other.  Nonetheless, the Saudis, like the other abstaining 
votes, participated actively in the endeavor and did not vote against the final product, 
indicating that they saw some potential for a universal charter on human rights.118  The 
conclusion for the present purposes is that the definition of human rights is an open issue.  
There is a consensus that universal human rights exist but none as to what those rights 
might be—apart from general agreement cited by Allen and Keohane that there is a 
human right to life and freedom from torture and slavery. 
 
                                                 
116 See, for example, Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 
24-26. 
117 UDHR, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Pt. III, Art. 7[d].    
118 Morsink, 21, 24. 
48
B. ETHICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 
1. Walzer’s High Standards for Intervention 
Regardless of the unresolved issue of human rights standards, human rights 
already figure directly in discussions of the justice of war in the issue of humanitarian 
interventions.  The use of force in these cases violates the modern international norm of 
respecting state sovereignty, and the debate over the ethics of humanitarian intervention 
pivots on the question of what human rights conditions justify this violation.  Against the 
principles of inviolable state sovereignty as a means to the end of international stability, 
“the growth of humanitarian international law represents an implicit acknowledgement 
of… transcendent values”119 that can justify military action across international borders 
in the absence of an earlier attack. 
The UN has sanctioned interventions on numerous occasions, giving them some 
status as customary international law.  Nonetheless, the UN Charter does not explicitly 
authorize humanitarian interventions, seeking to constrain interstate violence within the 
bounds of self-defense.  This creates some tension between positive international law and 
the moral considerations that drive many states to intervene across international 
boundaries for reasons that are clearly separate from self-defense (at least to the extent 
that “self” is defined as the citizens of a given state).  Johnson, commenting on this moral 
shortfall of international law, goes so far as to say that “the contemporary jus ad bellum 
of international law does not measure up to the moral standard of justice; rather, its 
coalescence around the ‘aggressor-defender’ dichotomy has led to an erroneous stress on 
the first resort to military force—‘firing the first shot’ or first crossing an international 
boundary by military force.”120 
The conflict between state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns is ancient, and 
protection of the innocent across political boundaries is one of the oldest just causes for 
war.  Augustine identified it, holding it up as morally superior even (or especially) to a 
war fought for self-defense.  Grotius wrote that it is a law of nature that  
every sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over his own 
subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power can justly interfere. Yet                                                  
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where a Busiris, a Phalaris or a Thracian Diomede provoke their people to 
despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having themselves 
abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose the rights of independent 
sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of nations.121 
Walzer’s ideas on what levels these “cruelties” must attain in order for 
intervention to be justified have been very influential in contemporary just war discourse, 
and this thesis will focus on them.  He begins with a high degree of deference to state 
sovereignty.  Citing John Stuart Mill, Walzer distinguishes self-determination from 
political freedom and places a higher priority on the former.  His primary justification for 
this ordering of values is the assertion that freedom cannot be bestowed upon a group of 
people by an external force; it can only be earned through the virtue of the people and 
their triumph in a struggle against oppression.122  Quite remarkably, Walzer seems to 
accept Mill’s argument that “a state is self-determining even if its citizens struggle and 
fail to establish free institutions, but it has been deprived of self-determination if such 
institutions are established by an intrusive neighbor.”123 
Upon this basis, “the first reading” of Walzer’s rule on humanitarian intervention 
is that “we as outsiders must presume that another state is legitimate unless it has proved 
otherwise by actions that we cannot ignore.”124  The human rights violations that rise to 
this level are those that are so severe as to make talk of self-determination or state 
sovereignty seem “cynical or irrelevant”—that is, “cases of enslavement or massacre.”125  
In this regard, Walzer’s standards appear to coincide neatly with the core of consensus on 
universal human rights, discussed above: that governments cannot murder or enslave 
their people. 
Walzer faithfully applied this doctrine in his opposition to the recent war against 
Iraq, going to great lengths to somehow mitigate the dangers of Saddam’s regime to the 
outside world while honoring the right of the regime to rule.  One infers that Walzer did 
not feel that the level of human rights abuses in Iraq rose to the level of justifying 
                                                 
121 Grotius, Bk. II, Ch. 25, VIII. 
122 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 87. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Smith, 286. 
125 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 90. 
50
humanitarian intervention.  As alternatives to a war of regime change, Walzer proposed 
the extension of no-fly zones over the entire country, the imposition of “smart sanctions,” 
no-notice reconnaissance flights, stationing of UN soldiers inside Iraq to guard inspected 
facilities, and forward-deployment of troops on Iraq’s borders.126  Such measures would 
have resulted in Iraq being sovereign in name only, and meet Walzer’s own definition of 
foreign aggression.  Yet, the fact that these policies would have left Iraq’s sovereignty 
nominally intact seems to have immense significance for Walzer. 
 
2. Comparison to Preventive War 
There is a remarkable parallel between the need for an ethical boundary for 
humanitarian intervention, discussed above, and an ethical boundary for preventive war 
against terrorism, discussed in the previous chapter.  In both cases, there is pressure to 
violate the norm of state sovereignty, and that pressure arises from that state’s deficient 
performance in protecting the basic rights of its citizens.  In humanitarian interventions, 
poor human rights conditions are the immediate cause of the desire to intervene; in 
preventive war, poor human rights conditions present an indirect danger via their role in 
fomenting international terrorism or their signification that a government cannot be 
trusted to possess WMD.  As shown, Walzer and others insist on high levels of human 
rights abuses to justify intervention.  But this insistence warrants examination for two 
reasons. 
First, there is an inconsistency between Walzer’s high threshold for what abuses 
of rights justify foreign intervention and his low threshold for what rights abuses justify 
resistance to foreign aggression.  In the latter context, Walzer argues that aggression can 
exist in many forms and is no less a crime because it is unresisted—that it can occur even 
without “the fall of blood.”127  Thus, Walzer holds that an uncontested invasion or some 
other form of latent intimidation or coercion is a just cause for war against the aggressor 
state.  Yet at the same time, Walzer holds that uncontested repression of a people by their 
own leaders—repression so effective as to not require the government to murder or 
enslave its subjects—fails to justify foreign intervention.  
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For Walzer, then, the difference between the violation of rights by a domestic 
tyrant and violation of rights by a foreign invader is of stratospheric ethical significance; 
it is the agent of oppression, not the extent of oppression, that is ethically dispositive.  
Walzer is aware of this and explains that “recognition of sovereignty is the only way we 
have of establishing an arena in which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) 
won.”128  This leads Walzer to the famous domestic analogy: “As with individuals, so 
with sovereign states: there are things that we cannot do to them, even for their own 
ostensible good.”129 
But the domestic analogy has limits, and when the violations of human rights 
within international borders reach some point, it is irresponsible to avoid the fact that 
states are not individuals.  Walzer’s heavy reliance on the domestic analogy to defend the 
sovereignty of even the most heinous regimes approaches a conflation of means and ends, 
a common tendency described concisely by Christopher: 
It is not unusual for instrumental policies aimed at some primary objective 
to assume a value of their own, even to the extent that they can actually 
impede the attainment of the objective they were designed to achieve.  In 
international society, the principle of non-intervention has become 
sacrosanct, even to the point of disregarding the reasons that underlie its 
formulation in the first place.130 
The second reason to question different standards for humanitarian interventions 
and preventive wars is that, as discussed in chapter III, human rights violations that fall 
short of “enslavement and massacre” appear to play a prominent role nonetheless in the 
generation of significant amounts of death and misery through terrorism.  To many 
commentators, the fact that the regimes recently deposed by the United States have had 
poor human rights records is nothing more than a rhetorically convenient coincidence that 
allows policy makers to drape imperialistic policies in the language of humanitarian 
intervention.  But to others, the direct danger that illiberal regimes pose to their own 
citizens is inseparable from the indirect danger they pose to civilization as a whole 
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through their role in constituting the threat of terrorism.  Walzer himself indirectly hinted 
at this relationship in 1994 under the topic of “the politics of rescue”:  
No doubt, the civilized world is capable of living with grossly uncivilized 
behavior… But behavior of that kind, unchallenged, tends to spread, to be 
imitated or reiterated.  Pay the moral price of silence and callousness, and 
you will soon have to pay the political price of turmoil and lawlessness 
nearer to home.131 
Walzer has conventional interstate threats in mind here, and he is reprimanding “silence 
and callousness” in the face of outright murder and enslavement.  But “silence and 
callousness” at lesser abuses of human rights have had similar consequences.  Indeed, it 
is impossible not to notice that Walzer’s words eerily foreshadow 9/11.  Accordingly, 
there is a case to be made that foreign intervention is justifiable, practically as well as 




Max Weber famously defined government as that authority which has a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force within a territory.  Here we encounter another parallel: The 
questions of whether a government is just and whether a war is just are, fundamentally, 
questions about the ethics of the use of violence for political purposes.  Walzer writes that 
“war is most often a tyranny” and that the “peculiar horror of war” is that “it is a social 
practice in which force is used by and against men as loyal or constrained members of 
states and not as individuals who choose their own enterprises and activities.”132  Perhaps 
inadvertently, Walzer is documenting the fact that an unjust government and an unjust 
war both violate rights and that, ultimately, they violate the same rights.  In light of this, 
the tremendous emphasis that Walzer and other modern just war thinkers place upon the 
distinction between violations of rights conducted within a country and violations of 
rights conducted across international borders appears to be out of proportion.  Johnson 
criticizes this distinction when he writes that “justice as a component of the jus ad bellum 
requires that both aggression and defense be understood more broadly than in terms of                                                  
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military force, that intervention across political boundaries can sometimes—even if only 
rarely—be a just action, and that the legal existence of a regime does not guarantee its 
moral legitimacy.”133  Once the distinction between external aggression via military 
means and internal aggression via governmental means dissolves, it seems quite natural 
that ethical standards for the violation of state sovereignty for the purposes of preventing 
terrorism and for the purposes of preventing human rights abuses should be one and the 
same. 
To put this point in more explicit just war terms, both preventive wars aimed at 
terrorism and humanitarian interventions aimed at defending basic human rights have the 
same objective of changing—or at least influencing—the government of a state.  The 
rationales differ: One has a basis in practical security concerns and the other has a basis 
in altruism.  But these different reasons are little more than different answers to the same 
prudential jus ad bellum question of proportionality of means and ends—two different 
teleological justifications for war.  As discussed in chapter II, the perception of a need to 
wage preventive war in self-defense will always be subjective, even if it is valid.  
Objections to the legitimization of preventive self-defense as a just cause, therefore, can 
be understood as reasonable apprehension at allowing such subjective reasoning to force 
its way into what we want to be an objective, deontological criterion for justice.  In turn, 
it becomes clear that what the current debates about preventive war and humanitarian 
rescues are both struggling to identify is a formal, deontological just cause criterion for 
intervention across state boundaries.  Identifying this criterion is troublesome because it 
exists well beyond the safety of the objective cases for self-defense that are possible in 
purely defensive or preemptive scenarios.  In both prevention and humanitarian 
intervention, it appears that that formal criterion must be independent of subjective 
conceptions of self-defense and must instead lie in fact that a regime denies its citizens 
certain basic human rights. 
Recent just war commentators have written of the ethical parallels between 
prevention and humanitarian intervention in their analysis of the war on terrorism, yet 
seem reluctant to draw any conclusions from it.  Most prominently, Hehir, in a piece on 
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the consequences of the “Bush Doctrine” of preventive war, follows his discussion of the 
threat of mass-casualty terrorism with a discussion of the right of intervention, which he 
analyzes in the context of humanitarian causes.134  This progression is natural, as Hehir 
recognizes that preventive wars and humanitarian rescues are both subcategories of the 
general category of intervention.  Even his terminology reflects this, as he uses the apt 
term “strategic” intervention, as opposed to “humanitarian” intervention, for the kinds of 
military operations envisioned in the new US strategy.  Hehir thus correctly identifies two 
different teleological rationales for what is essentially the same action.  Yet, just as Hehir 
appears poised to unify the ethical dimensions of these two vexing international questions 
under one deontology, he abruptly insists that “one needs to distinguish humanitarian 
intervention… from what might be called strategic great-power intervention.”  He 
concludes that “a case for [strategic] intervention is possible, but it involves a different 
set of criteria than humanitarian intervention.”135  Hehir provides no reason why this 
must be so. 
But other writers have traveled farther on Hehir’s logical path, more fully 
exploring the connection between human rights and prevention.  This thesis will conclude 
by examining two proposals for the incorporation of human rights standards into an 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. CONTRADICTIONS IN THE STATUS QUO   
In making a case for the ethics of preventive war, this thesis has attacked the 
status quo on the basis of several contradictions: the contradiction within a jus ad bellum 
that seeks to minimize human suffering by demanding that war be a last resort, regardless 
of how much suffering could be avoided by an earlier resort to war; the contradiction 
within an international order that seeks security by protecting the sovereignty of states, 
regardless of the inherent security risks posed by certain types of states; and the 
contradiction within an international order that seeks to protect human rights by 
recognizing the sovereignty of all states, regardless of how some of those states abuse 
human rights within their borders.  All of these contradictions are manifestations of a 
“deep fault line of liberal theory”136 with state sovereignty, self-determination, and 
freedom from foreign intervention on the one side and human rights and democracy on 
the other. 
 
1. “Two Liberalisms” 
Gerry Simpson calls these two sides of the fault line the “two liberalisms” of the 
international order.  The first of these is “Charter liberalism,” which seeks international 
peace by “emphasizing the sovereign equality of states”137 and rejecting the idea that the 
internal qualities of states should have any legal significance.  This version of liberalism 
resonates with the certain political and cultural outlooks that question the standing of the 
West to levy judgments upon the ethical systems and governmental practices of other 
countries.  This view was prevalent during the early and mid-twentieth century, when it 
moderated the behavior of democratic states in the post-Versailles period and had an 
obvious impact on the UN Charter, from which Simpson derives his term.  The essence 
of this belief was the domestic analogy: that “entities that were sovereign and 
independent were entitled to the same rights as other similarly situated states… States, 
like individuals, were entitled to full status regardless of constitutional structure or                                                  
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political belief.”138  This view remains prevalent and underlies the insistence on high 
standards for interventions advanced by Walzer and others. 
Simpson’s second version of liberalism is the “anti-pluralist” type, which 
recognizes that the internal qualities of states have an impact on international order and 
should thus be reflected in international institutions.  In its earliest form in the mid-
1800’s, liberal anti-pluralism applied a vague standard of civilization to entities in the 
international community: Western powers treated each other as equals while they 
maintained substantially different relations with “uncivilized” states, which were often 
subjects of colonialism.  This is undoubtedly a major reason for the resurgence of the 
term “empire” into the discourse about current US policy; Jedediah Purdy’s description 
of the newest form of anti-pluralist liberalism as “liberal imperialism,”139 while 
tendentious, is nonetheless apt.  But this post-Cold War iteration of judgmental liberalism 
is based on a growing consensus that human rights—not as markers of Western cultural 
superiority, but as universal values—should have a higher priority in international affairs 
that state sovereignty.  This view is wary of the limitations of the domestic analogy and 
sees sovereignty as ultimately residing with individuals, not with states.  The “strong 
form” of this anti-plural liberalism tends to “favor forms of exclusion” in international 
institutions based on human rights criteria and is “less constrained about recommending 
military action against illiberal or outlaw or recalcitrant states.”140 
These two divergent applications of liberal principles place the entire debate over 
human rights and state sovereignty—including the debate on preventive interventions 
against illiberal states—into historical perspective.  Simpson observes that while human 
rights became more prominent in the international arena during and after the Cold War, 
“the practice of international organizations remained pluralistic.  There was no serious 
attempt made to fix human rights obligations, routinely, to entry requirements into the 
international community…”141  In light of this, the linkage of human rights to the justice 
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of preventive war is merely one application of a resurging “strong” anti-pluralist 
liberalism that is manifesting itself in other ways.     
     
2. A Debilitating Dichotomy 
Paralleling the split in liberal thought documented by Simpson is a stubborn 
tendency in the West to dichotomize foreign policy motives by refusing to acknowledge 
any overlap between what is practical and what is idealistic.  Healthy suspicion that 
humanitarian language might be a cover for venal self-interests has transmuted into an 
axiom that it must be.  This is a plausible explanation for Hehir’s instinct that criteria for 
humanitarian intervention should be different from criteria for strategic intervention.  It is 
easier to see in less thoughtful commentary on current US policy.  Typical is Richard 
Falk, who alleges that the post-9/11 security strategy of the United States—a policy that, 
so far, has rid the world of two of the most oppressive regimes on earth—has actually 
“weakened” humanitarian law and resulted in the “eclipse of human rights”142 in the 
international arena.  Apparently, Falk sees justice and humanitarianism only in wars that 
the United States has no practical reason to fight.  For example, Falk found the Kosovo 
war “confusing”143 because, one infers, the United States had no compelling self-interest 
in fighting it, giving Falk no foundation for his pre-fabricated opposition.  Much of this 
kind of thinking is based on the double standards evident in past US policy, which 
occasionally did subordinate immediate human rights concerns to other interests. 
But as this thesis has attempted to show, it is nearly impossible for a coherent 
strategy against terrorism and associated WMD threats to “eclipse” human rights in the 
same manner that US policy may have done so during the Cold War.  This is because 
human rights are central to both the practical need and the ethical basis for a strategy of 
waging preventive war against illiberal states.  Human rights are also the sine qua non of 
the political end-states that preventive war would attempt to bring about in target states.  
One need not be an altruist to reach these conclusions; not even the most Machiavellian 
foreign policy designer could ignore them.  The double standards that have existed in US 
foreign policy, passionately recited by Falk and others, only reinforce the conclusion that 
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the international status quo before 9/11 contained inherent contradictions that forced 
choices between what was expedient and what was ethical.  The fact that the US has 
adopted a new strategy that threatens the international status quo might signify to some 
critics that the double standards of the past have proved untenable, and that US policy is 
converging on the standard of human rights.  As a result, reflexive opposition to US 
actions to protect itself risks becoming reflexive opposition to what could be a historic 
opportunity: a global human rights agenda backed by the resources of a superpower. 
Other observers have recognized that the idealism that motivates humanitarian 
interventions and the pragmatism that motivates strategic interventions have become 
inseparable—that “ideals and self-interests are both generally considered necessary 
ingredients of the national interest.”144 
Something quite important has happened in American foreign 
policymaking with little notice of digestion of its meaning.  Morality, 
values, ethics, universal principles—the whole panoply of ideals in 
international affairs that were once almost the exclusive domain of 
preachers and scholars—have taken root in the hearts, or at least the 
minds, of the American foreign policy community… and although some in 
[this community] may still be using moral language to cloak a traditional 
national security strategy agenda, one gets the sense that it is more than 
that.145 
Another writer observes that “idealism and realism have converged behind the policy of 
the United States in the Middle East.”146  This new consistency between the ethical and 
practical dimensions of US foreign policy is driving reexaminations of the prohibition of 
preventive war.  The key issue is how to legitimize preventive war in way that does not 
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B. RESOLUTIONS IN THE FUTURE: TWO PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING 
PREVENTIVE WAR 
 
1. Prevention Bounded by International Law: A “Cosmopolitan 
Institutional” Approach 
The boldest entry is Allen Buchanan and Robert E. Keohane’s “cosmopolitan 
institutional proposal.”  It “begins with the assumption that it can be morally permissible 
to use force to stop presently occurring massive violations of human rights,” from which 
follows a “prima facie case for the moral permissibility of using force to prevent massive 
violations of human rights.”147  Buchanan and Keohane do not rely upon a link between 
regimes that violate human rights and the existence of mass-casualty terrorism as the 
justification for preventive war on humanitarian grounds.  Instead, they rely upon the fact 
that a terrorist attack is itself a violation of human rights.  Preventing the attack, 
therefore, is a human rights objective. 
In Buchanan and Keohane’s proposal, the power to authorize preventive wars 
would reside within an international body, either a veto-less UNSC or some other 
institution.  Interestingly, the favored alternative to the UNSC is something like a league 
of democracies—a group of states whose “moral reliability”148 qualifies them to render 
collective judgments on the justice of preventive war.  This coalition would have entrance 
requirements consisting mainly of human rights standards.  The authors do not specify 
those standards, but stipulate that they exclude “unambiguous violators of human 
rights.”149 
Whatever the form of the institution or its requirements for membership might be, 
Buchanan and Keohane endow it with powers to discourage both disingenuous calls for 
war under preventive rationales and parochial opposition to preventive wars that might be 
necessary.  In an ex ante process, states proposing prevention would make a case for war 
and  the  body  would  vote  to  authorize it.   In  an  ex post  process, investigators would  
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determine if the case for preventive war proved to be valid.  If so, the body would 
penalize states who opposed the war; if not, the body would penalize states that pushed 
for the war. 
Although they do not say so explicitly, what Buchanan and Keohane attempt to do 
with this proposal is provide a formal criterion for the legitimization of a preventive war.  
The formal criterion they offer is multilateral collective agreement that the prudential 
case for a war is reasonable.  Buchanan and Keohane do not advertise this proposal as an 
optimum solution, and present it instead as a useful and feasible improvement to the 
status quo.  Nonetheless, their recommendation has three significant drawbacks. 
First, as the authors are well aware, the judgment of a group of states—even 
liberal democracies—would not necessarily be any less subjective than the judgment of 
one of them.  As Walzer wrote on the topic of UN-justified interventions, “The politics if 
the UN is no more edifying than the politics of many of its members, and the decision to 
intervene, whether it is local or global, whether it is made individually or collectively, is 
always a political decision.  Its motives will be mixed; the collective will to act is sure to 
be as impure as the individual will to act (and is likely to be much slower).”150  Buchanan 
and Keohane do not claim that their processes would remove subjectivity from the 
decision to wage preventive war, but merely that they would “take the sting out of the 
fact that there is no unique, non-arbitrary threshold of probability of harm needed to 
justify prevention.”151  This leaves much to be desired, as objectivity is an important 
characteristic of any legal regime to regulate prevention. 
Second, there are problems with Buchanan and Keohane’s insistence on sanctions 
against a state that advocates a preventive war that fails to achieve the human rights 
benefits—again, prevention of a terrorist or WMD attack falls into this category—that its 
advocates had claimed it would.  First of all, any national leader, especially in a 
democracy, who expends blood and treasure on an unprovoked war that turns out to be 
unnecessary would be subject to hefty “sanctions” of the domestic political type.  
Buchanan and Keohane cite such democratic constraints as a reason to favor a coalition 
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of democracies as the judges of preventive war,152 but it is not clear why these electoral 
pressures are insufficient by themselves to ensure good faith behavior by leaders of 
democracies on questions of preventive war. 
But the more important aspect of the authors’ provision for additional, artificial 
sanctions against erring leaders is their failure to account for what late medieval just war 
theorists called “invincible ignorance,”153 which is reflected in the modern distinction 
between justifiable and excusable homicide: an moral agent who makes a good faith 
effort to ascertain the justice of his cause cannot be sanctioned merely because his cause 
is—or proves to be—objectively unjust.  To do so would be to punish people not because 
they make unethical decisions, but because they are not omniscient.  Indeed, Buchanan 
and Keohane appear to be basing much of their proposal to combat dishonesty in 
preventive justifications for war when the real problem is uncertainty.  The limited ability 
of intelligence to positively ascertain the extent and timing of terrorist and rogue state 
WMD threats is precisely the reason why a purely preemptive approach to those 
problems is untenable and why a preventive approach may be the only viable defense. 
To Grotius, uncertainty of the justice of war argues in favor of peace.  But 
dispassionate assessments of the costs of regime change versus the risks of inaction in 
today’s environment suggest that erring on the side of peace is not always the more 
responsible choice.  Given these conditions, it would be sophistry to sanction decision-
makers for the epistemological limitations on their knowledge of threats: If a preventive 
war could be justified on the demonstrable certainty of a threat, it would fall under the 
regime of preemption rather than prevention.  The decision to wage a preventive war 
invariably occurs under the conditions of uncertainty, which are particularly severe in the 
threats of terrorism and WMD.  Dealing with this uncertainty involves making good 
bets—and sometimes good bets miss.  Buchanan and Keohane’s proposal to raise the 
stakes on leaders tasked with protecting the lives of their citizens is unhelpful in this 
regard. 
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Finally, Buchanan and Keohane’s approach to limiting preventive war is ethically 
evasive.  The salient ethical question in both preventive wars and humanitarian 
interventions is to find an objective, deontological standard that, when combined with 
subjective value judgments on the prudence of such a war, can support a determination as 
to whether the violation of another state’s sovereignty is just.  By recycling prudential 
criteria of proportionality and chance of success through institutional machinery in order 
to synthesize an objective legal criterion for preventive war, Buchanan and Keohane 
avoid the central ethical question, which is the limits of the right—not the usefulness—of 
the target state’s sovereignty.  In place of a rights-based answer to this question, the 
authors offer a kind of collectivized utilitarianism.  Granted, human rights values might 
be inputs of this utilitarian equation.  But this does not alter the fact that the cosmopolitan 
institutional approach fails to provide a deontological answer to the question of the limits 
of rights to sovereignty.  
As a result, it is unclear what Buchanan and Keohane would offer as ethical 
guidance to individual states on deciding how to vote on a proposed preventive war or 
whether to participate in it.  If the answer is pure utilitarianism in terms of costs versus 
human rights and security benefits, then—as Kant sardonically suggested—the 
cosmopolitan institutional approach would indeed banish the concept of right from an 
important part of international relations, replacing it with the dubious legitimacy of a 
majority vote.  But if the behavior of individual states on this matter is to have any basis 
in right, then those states must have a formal, deontological  criterion—independent of 
utilitarian calculations—for deciding whether or not a preventive war is just. 
It is curious the Buchanan and Keohane find observance of human rights to be of 
central importance in qualifying states to authorize preventive war, yet stop short of 
concluding that observance of human rights is what qualifies states to be states in the first 
place.  The following proposal proceeds down that latter path. 
 
2. Prevention Bounded by Ethics: A New Jus ad Bellum 
As opposed to creating an institutional process as a source of formal legitimacy 
for preventive war, this author proposes that the very existence of an illiberal regime 
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satisfies a formal criterion for preventive war—and for that matter, all other 
infringements on that state’s sovereignty.  The formal criterion is that of just cause.  Here, 
just cause does not arise from a subjective perception of a need for self-defense nor a 
collective judgment on the merits of a case for preventive war as in the cosmopolitan 
institutional approach; those strategic and utilitarian calculations are left to state leaders.  
Instead, this formal criterion concerns itself solely with the objectively manageable 
question of whether a state fails to meet certain human rights standards.  The illegitimacy 
of a state would be the deontological basis for intervention, and, when combined with 
other formal and prudential criteria, would make a preventive war “just” in the classical 
sense of the word.  Thus, while Buchanan and Keohane employ human rights standards 
identify the judges of preventive war, this approach employs human rights standards to 
identify the defendants also.  With that, a new jus ad bellum for preventive war and for 
humanitarian interventions might go as follows: 
 
a. Formal Criteria 
(1) Just Cause.  As stated above, the fact that a regime fails to meet certain 
universal standards of human rights would be a just cause for a war of regime change 
against that state.  Needless to say, this would be a significant change in the international 
order.  But it is little more than the logical application of the principles that (a) the 
international system of sovereign states is a formal means to the practical end of 
protecting individual rights worldwide and (b) a government that is inimical to the end of 
human rights has no right to exist.  The legitimization of preventive war against illiberal 
states is an ethical consequence of the fact that such a state “does not have the same 
legitimacy as a properly constituted national or international regime.”154  The new jus ad 
bellum, therefore, does not extend a right to intervene so much as it withdraws a right to 
be protected from attack.  This inversion of the right of war from a positive to a negative 
sense, if fully developed, promises new clarity in just war thinking. 
It must be reiterated that self-defense is specifically proscribed as a just 
cause for intervention, whether strategic (preventive) or humanitarian.  Security benefits 
that may be won by the removal of an oppressive regime are merely additional inputs to 
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the teleological rationale for war.155  The deontological right to intervene is independent 
of our security concerns.  
(2) Right Intention.  Since the cause for intervention is human rights 
violations, right intention would demand that the war and occupation be aimed at the 
improvement of those conditions.  In other words, the occupiers would have to leave 
behind a more liberal regime than the one they removed from power.  Traditionally, right 
intention has ruled out objectives for war that are incidental to the cause; but in the case 
of a preventive war against terrorism and WMD threats, it would not be unreasonable to 
allow the intervening state to confront terrorist elements directly and eliminate WMD 
capabilities, at least for the period during which occupation is necessary.  These threats 
could be construed as manifestations of the prior human rights conditions, meaning that 
confronting them would be germane, at least, to the cause for war. 
(3) Proper Authority and Open Declaration.  The criteria of proper 
authority and open declaration would remain largely intact, as the prosecution of war 
would remain in the purview of states.  However, the explicit identification of universal, 
enforceable standards of human rights by some international body might provide the 
normative basis for a migration of real authority to declare wars of intervention to the 
international level.  This resonates with Buchanan and Keohane’s proposal, but this 
counterproposal differs in that it considers the establishment of an explicit ethics of 
preventive war to be prior to the institutionalization of those ethics.   
(4) Last Resort.  The intellectually flimsy criterion of last resort would be 
assimilated into the proportionality criterion, where it logically belongs.  This would 
resolve the contradiction between last resort and proportionality and rectify the current 
bias of the jus ad bellum toward measures other than war that may, in the long run, result 
in more net harm than war itself. 
 
b. Prudential Criteria 
(1) Proportionality.  The proportionality criterion would be crucial in 
limiting the number of preventive wars that could be justly pursued by liberal states on 
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strategic and humanitarian grounds.  The criterion would compare not only the costs of 
such wars to their benefits, but also the relative costs and benefits of alternatives, thereby 
subsuming the last resort criterion.  Against war, proportionality would count the 
availability of alternative means if compulsion and prospects of spontaneous, indigenous 
improvements in human rights conditions in target states. 
(2) Chance of Success.  The chance of success criterion further inhibits the 
proliferation of preventive wars of liberation, insisting that a war of regime change have 
reasonable prospects of bringing about the replacement the existing government with a 
better one.  Substantial domestic opposition to the regime and a propensity for the 
establishment of a liberal government would likely be requisites.  This is where Walzer 
and Mill’s concern with the worthiness of oppressed peoples to be free properly belongs. 
 
c. Current Policy in Terms of a New Jus ad Bellum   
This framework appears to be useful in capturing the main disagreements 
over the recent war in Iraq.  According to these jus ad bellum criteria, the war of regime 
change against Saddam was justifiable in a formal, deontological sense.  (And if 
international law had been consistent with these formal criteria, the war would have been 
legal.)  There has been a questioning of the Bush administration’s intentions in Iraq—as 
Grotius realized, such accusations of impure intentions are unanswerable—but few of 
even the most vocal critics of the war dare to argue that Saddam had a “right” to rule the 
country.  The prudence of the war in Iraq is the crux of the debate: The most substantial 
clashes break out over the question of whether the benefits of removing Saddam were 
worth the costs.  As the new jus ad bellum makes self-defense a matter of teleological 
rather than deontological significance, the fact that Iraq turned out not to have a stockpile 
of WMD—given that the administration honestly believed that there was a significant 
probability that they were present—might be a strike against the strategic competence of 
the Bush administration, but it has nothing to do with the right of the United States and its 
allies to remove Saddam.  Nonetheless, this and other evidence that the war in Iraq is 
netting more harm than good allows opponents to legitimately describe it as “unjust,” as 
the jus ad bellum continues to demand both deontological and teleological validity of a 
just war. 
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This revised jus ad bellum also seems to provide plausible advice and 
reasonable controls on other imaginable preventive wars.  For the sake of completeness, 
it must be said that strategic interventions against other liberal democracies, in addition to 
being an empty set teleologically, are prohibited deontologically.  All of the interventions 
that the United States might realistically be inclined to consider, from the “Axis of Evil” 
to a broader list of problem states, are against illiberal regimes—and as chapter III of this 
thesis argues, that is no coincidence.  Preventive wars intended to change the regimes of 
these states would therefore have just causes.  But many of these wars would fail to pass 
the prudential tests, as either the costs of regime change would outweigh the resulting 
benefits, or other avenues, including domestic trends, would offer greater chances of 
success at less cost.  In these cases, the new jus ad bellum would constrain any US urge 
to forcibly change regimes on the basis that doing so would be unwise, and thus unjust.  
But the new jus ad bellum would not constrain US policy on the grounds that these 
regimes have a right to sovereignty.  If the dangers posed by states such as Iran and North 
Korea were to become more severe in the assessment of US policy makers, interventions 
against them might very well meet the prudential criteria of justice.  Those who disagree 
would be placed in the very difficult position of arguing that it the world is ethically 
bound to protect regimes that oppress their own people and pose severe dangers—even if 
indirectly—to the outside world. 
One final benefit of this new jus ad bellum for intervention is that it could 
bring about a new urgency to codify international human rights standards.  As previously 
discussed, current documents are woefully inadequate for this role because they are 
philosophically unsound and tend to promote mere social desiderata to the status of 
rights.  Real human rights might very well be those that we are willing to integrate into a 
standard for the legitimization of war.  
 
C. NEW REASONS TO ANSWER AN OLD QUESTION  
The debate over the justice of preventive war is not an esoteric, isolated 
discussion that is relevant today only because of the peculiar circumstances of the United 
States possessing the capability to wage such wars and international terrorism providing 
67
an urgent reason for doing so.  Rather, the current debate is only the latest manifestation 
of a more fundamental question that has haunted international affairs since the beginnings 
of the current state-based system.  Arguments over membership requirements of 
international bodies, rules for humanitarian interventions, and the ethics of preventive 
“strategic” interventions all arise from the tension between state sovereignty as a means 
and human freedom as an end.  Taking up the last form of the question, this thesis has 
attempted to resolve some of that tension in the language of just war doctrine.  But 
similar answers have already been derived from the other forms of the question, and 
many of those answers are oriented toward the conclusion that the internal political 
characteristics of states are ethically meaningful and that international institutions and the 
laws of war cannot ignore them. 
Indeed, the idea of linking human rights with preventive action appeared as early 
as 1946 during the initial stages of the drafting of the UDHR, when Henri Laugier, a UN 
official, reminded delegates that if a mechanism for human rights enforcement  
had existed a few years ago, if it had been powerful and if the universal 
support of public opinion had given it authority, international action would 
have been mobilized immediately against the first authors and supporters 
of fascism and Nazism.  The human community would have been able to 
stop those who started the war at the moment they were still weak and the 
world catastrophe would have been avoided.156 
The UN failed to make human rights an enforceable standard of international behavior.  
But today, there is a renewed imperative to do so as new potential forms of 
“catastrophe”—albeit ones that owe much to the totalitarian movements of the 1930’s 
and 40’s—are at hand.  Morally, we require a new conception of just war to enable us to 
confront these dangers without betraying the ethics on the use of force that distinguishes 
us from our enemies.  And practically, we require a new conception of just war upon 
which to defend our actions and win the support of critics, foreign and domestic alike, 
whose diverging views on the ethics of violence are becoming increasingly ominous for 
the future of Western Civilization. 
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